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ABSTRACT
PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC:
A CALL TO WAR IN THE POST-COLD WAR
UNITED STATES
by
Benjamin C. Larkin
University of New Hampshire, May, 2015

This thesis considers the rhetoric advocating for the use of military force by
United States Presidents following the end of the Cold War, using Aristotle’s model of
rhetoric as a persuasive tool as a framework. Aristotle asked: What is the character of
the speaker? What logical arguments has the speaker made? Has the speaker
understood and appealed to the emotions of the listener? As of this writing, there have
been four United States Presidents since 1989: George H.W. Bush, William Clinton,
George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. Each used rhetoric to advocate for the use of
military force. By considering the rhetoric of each of these Presidents in the context of
the specific situation he confronted, and by examining United States Congressional and
public response, it is clear that while the character of the speaker, actual or imputed,
may have been important in persuading a listener, and while logical arguments were
important in persuading a listener, it was absolutely critical that the sitting President
understand and appeal to the emotions of the American people, including members of
Congress, to successfully advocate for the use of military force.

v

The four cases considered here, one for each post-Cold War President, provide
three examples where the President was able to understand and make that critical
appeal to the emotions of his audiences and one example where the President did not
initially understand or appeal to the emotions of his audiences. Presidents George
H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, who successfully understood and appealed
to the emotions of their audiences, were able to successfully advocate for the use of
military force. President Obama, who did not initially understand or successfully appeal
to the emotions of his audiences, failed in his advocacy for the use of military force.
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Introduction

On September 24, 2014, President Barack Obama delivered a speech to the
United Nations General Assembly in which he called Islamic State terrorists, specifically
ISIL, a “network of death.”1 He went on to detail how the United States, working with the
international community, should and would “destroy” ISIL.2 President Obama’s diction
was no accident. He was not the first American president, or even the first post-Cold
War American president, to use powerful, maybe even inflammatory, rhetoric to sway
opinion in support of his position to use military force against a perceived threat. In fact,
all four Post-Cold War American presidents have relied heavily on the power of their
rhetoric to justify American military action and involvement in war. The term “network of
death,” for instance, was a characterization of what President Obama considered a
threat to the American way life and lent support to his appeal for what he considered
justified military action. Of the four post-Cold War presidents, George H.W. Bush,
William Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, each faced situations where he
believed United States military action was called for and justified. Each used powerful
and dramatic rhetoric in an attempt to define and characterize an enemy and a threat to
the United States and to call for military action. Three were successful. One was not.

i.

What is rhetoric?
To analyze post-Cold War Presidents’ use of rhetoric to advocate United States

military involvement in various locales around the world requires some understanding of

1

the word “rhetoric.” Today “rhetoric” can have a negative connotation. The MerriamWebster Dictionary states in one definition that rhetoric can mean, “language that is
intended to influence people that may not be honest or reasonable.”3 However, the
perception by listeners about how honest or reasonable the speaker who is using
rhetoric is turns out to be an important piece of a more classical definition of rhetoric.
Merriam-Webster also provides the more classical definition, “the art or skill of speaking
or writing formally and effectively especially as a way to persuade or influence people.”4
Rhetoric, therefore, in the modern use of the term can be persuasive or effective, and
yet still be less than honest. To be most persuasive, however, a speaker must be
perceived as being honest and reasonable. Classically, being perceived as being
honest and reasonable was evidence of character and added to the logical and
emotional elements of the speaker’s argument.

ii.

Aristotle’s model of rhetoric
The idea of persuasive rhetoric can be traced to Aristotle. Writing in 350 B.C.E.,

Aristotle defined rhetoric simply as the “faculty of observing (using) in any given case
the available means of persuasion.”5 A speaker, according to Aristotle, had not only to
think about the subject matter upon which he or she was trying to be persuasive, but to
think about the techniques available to be persuasive. Rhetoric, therefore, was not
connected to any particular subject matter, but was a useful and necessary tool across
all subject matters.
Aristotle identified three methods of effective persuasion. First, the better the
character of the speaker, the more persuasive he or she was. Aristotle argued, “We
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believe good men more fully and more readily than others . . .”6 In Aristotle’s time the
character of the speaker was an important factor in how the speaker was perceived and
how persuasive the speaker was, although, perhaps it was more common then for a
listener to know the speaker than it is today. The idea of “character” is tied directly to
the question of “honesty” considered by listeners today. However, character also can
be implied or imputed by the office held by the speaker, for instance the office of the
presidency, rather than simply the person.
Second, Aristotle stated, persuasion could be achieved by the speaker
understanding and appealing to the emotions of the listeners. Aristotle noted that, “Our
judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained
and hostile.”7 Characterizing or defining a situation can lead to an emotional response
by the listener. By understanding, utilizing and appealing to those emotions, a
speaker’s argument can be perceived as stronger or more persuasive.
Third, according to Aristotle, a speaker could be persuasive through the logic of
the speech itself.8 An argument in which facts could be proved, or apparently proved,
was more persuasive. “Persuasive” did not necessarily mean the facts presented were
accurate or truthful, but rather that they were perceived as accurate. In addition, as we
will see, a logical argument is stronger if the speaker is able to connect the logical
elements with the emotions of the listener.
Thus, Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric identified three distinct means of
persuasion: through the character of the speaker, through the emotions of the listeners,
and through the logic of the speech itself. A persuasive speaker in Aristotle’s time had
to use and master all three means of persuasion. The same is true today, although I
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argue below that while character and logic are important elements of persuasion, when
making the decision to use military force in a post-Cold War world, understanding and
appealing to the hearers’ emotions is the most critical means of persuasion.
Though a complete discussion of why people make decisions based upon
emotion, even more so than logic, is beyond the scope of this thesis, there is medical
support for the proposition that in the absence of emotion, people find it very difficult to
make even basic decisions even understanding the logical consequences. 9 Perhaps a
simpler way to understand the importance of emotion in decision-making is to consider
the concept of “official narratives.”10 An official narrative is a way for a government
official, a President in the context of this thesis, to condense a complex foreign policy
objective, such as going to war, into an easily communicated message.11 As we will
see, an “easily communicated” message often means a message evoking common
emotions based upon a shared understanding of an historical use of military force or the
consequences of not using military force.

iii. Application of the Aristotle model of rhetoric to the rhetoric of post-Cold War
Presidents
This thesis uses Aristotle’s definition and applies it to the rhetoric of post-Cold
War American presidents, specifically rhetoric in which the president was advocating for
America to take military action or go to war. Presidents Bush, Clinton, Bush and
Obama all used rhetoric to support the use of military force. Today, Americans are
bombarded with rhetoric. At the national level, though, only the President has almost
unfettered access to the American people primarily via his ability to speak live to all
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Americans on television, especially during time of crisis. Some argue that this ability to
communicate directly to the American public is the president’s greatest power.
One supporter of this view, Richard Neustadt, argued in 1960, during the Cold
War, and then later in 1990, right as the Cold War was drawing to a close, that the
power of persuasion was the real power of the President.12 According to Neustadt, the
separation of powers contemplated and prescribed by the United States Constitution,
was not so much a separation of powers as a “sharing” of powers. The president had
executive powers granted by the Constitution; he had legislative powers; he had powers
as the head of his party. However, with shared powers, Neustadt argued, the president
had to rely on his ability to persuade: “The essence of a President’s persuasive task is
to convince such men that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to
do for their sake and on their authority.”13 Persuasion, argued Neustadt, was even more
important than the President’s executive power granted by the Constitution or law or his
power as head of his party. Because of the President’s access to members of
Congress and the American public via television, radio and other media, rhetoric has
become an increasingly important tool in President’s power of persuasion.
While Neustadt was primarily writing about the President’s power to persuade
lawmakers and the legislative branch of government, the argument can be extended to
include the importance of being persuasive to members of the executive branch,
members of the judicial branch, and, of course, members of the public. In times of
crisis, especially when advocating the use of military force, presidents need the support
of the public and the support of Congress. While Presidents undoubtedly look for
international support as well, we will see that, most importantly, the President must
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persuade members of Congress and the American public of the necessity of going to
war. Thus, this thesis will address what effect post-Cold War presidential rhetoric had
on these two most important groups, lawmakers and the public, and what influence
these groups had upon the presidents.

iv. Defining the field of presidential rhetoric
Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., writing in 1986, summarized scholarship in the field of
presidential rhetoric and provided a definition of the field at that time that is still relevant
today. He referred to Neustadt’s originally published book as a godsend.14 Windt found
that scholars generally agreed that the nature of the presidency had transformed from a
“constitutional, administrative office to an executive, rhetorical office.”15 In other words,
presidents were not solely relying on powers granted them by the Constitution or
legislation to manage the country, but were increasingly formulating and advocating
policy and using rhetoric to do it. Windt noted three influences for this transformation:
increased activist leadership in the presidency, advancement of communications
technology (he was talking about television in the mid-1980s, though today, of course,
social media brings a whole new layer of communications technology), and the
changing nature of the modern presidential campaign.16
The field of presidential rhetoric, as defined by Windt, was “concerned with the
study of presidential public persuasion as it affects the ability of a President to exercise
the powers of office.”17 Windt’s point could be expanded to state that presidential
rhetoric and public persuasion not only affected the ability of a president to exercise the
powers of office, but affected a president’s ability to continue to exercise the powers of
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office by gaining re-election. In the situations considered below, not every post-Cold
War president was necessarily concerned with being re-elected, but each was
cognizant of his party and of public opinion. As we will see, each may also have been
considering his legacy.
As an example, the extent of executive power was one issue that was raised for
each post-Cold War President considered below. The President may have the
executive power to take military action, but if the President could persuade Congress to
support his policy choice, and rally the American public behind the decision, that
exercise of executive power was much stronger. If it was not clear whether the
President had the executive power of decision in a given situation, the President
generally wanted Congressional support even if he felt it was not necessary by law.
Similarly, if the general public supported the president’s policy, Congress often felt the
pressure to support the policy. With public and Congressional support, the President’s
ability to make decisions, especially the decision to use military force, became easier
politically.

v. The power of defining a situation
David Zarefsky, then professor at Northwestern University, writing in 2004,
further defined the field of presidential rhetoric. Zarefsky’s primary thesis was that a
President’s real power was to “define” a situation. He argued, “Naming a situation
provides the basis for understanding it and determining the appropriate response to it.” 18
The power of presidential rhetoric, according to Zarefsky, was to “define a political
reality.”19 If we accept Zarefsky’s premise that the reality of a situation is not a given,
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but can be and is characterized by the President through presidential rhetoric, then we
can see how a President who has access to and who uses modern communications
technology to advocate his position becomes so powerful. Zarefsky left no doubt by
arguing that to “choose a definition” of a situation was to “plead a cause” and to
“advance a claim.”20
While there remained little debate that American Presidents attempt to shape or
frame the political debate about a given issue through rhetoric, there remained some
question of how, exactly, presidents accomplish this feat and how to measure or define
success. For instance, Zarefsky argued that the terms “presidential rhetoric” and
“effect” were often too narrowly understood.21 Presidential rhetoric, according to
Zarefsky, should not solely focus on speeches, but should include the full array of
speeches, interviews, press conferences, position papers, and other interactions with
the media by the President and, at times, others in the administration. The effect of
presidential rhetoric, according to Zarefsky, should not just be looked at quantitatively.
Instead, he argued, while presidential rhetoric may result in a listener changing or
replacing his or her attitudes, it may also reinforce an existing attitude or position, or
result in modification in salience of a belief or attitude, or change the listener’s
perception of what others’ attitudes or beliefs are in relation to his or her own, or cause
a listener to think differently about what an attitude or belief means.22
In contrast, George C. Edwards struggled with what he found to be a lack of
empirical evidence that presidential rhetoric affected listeners in a measurable way.23
Edwards argued that presidents were frequently not successful in swaying public
opinion in support of presidential policies.24 Specifically, Edwards looked at the second
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term of William Clinton’s presidency and the failure of Clinton to achieve certain
domestic policy goals. He concluded, therefore, that there were only “limited effects” of
presidential rhetoric.25 However, Edwards did not necessarily disagree that presidential
rhetoric was very important in defining issues and shaping debate. As Zarefsky pointed
out, few would argue that presidential rhetoric makes no difference.26
While this thesis will not attempt to fully answer or consider these questions, it
argues that in certain situations, specifically referring to the call to use military force in
response to perceived threats to national security in the post-Cold War world,
presidential rhetoric was critical. Presidential speech defined the situation in each case
and advocated for a specific response. Zarefsky noted that all rhetoric was
“situational.”27 By examining four specific situations where the President advocated the
use of military force in response to a perceived threat to national security, one situation
each for the four post-Cold War presidents, this thesis argues that presidential rhetoric,
though not always successful, clearly was critical to the decision to use military force.

vi. The four case-studies considered herein
The four case-studies considered in this thesis are: George H.W. Bush’s
decision to invade Kuwait as part of Desert Storm in 1991, William Clinton’s decision to
bomb Kosovo in 1999, George W. Bush’s decision to invade first Afghanistan and then
Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11, and Barack Obama’s initial plea to use military force to
intervene in Syria after Assad’s use of poisonous gas in August of 2013. Below, in
discussing each case-study, this thesis will endeavor to set forth the context of the
rhetoric, analyze the rhetoric itself, and examine the response by Congress and the
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American public in the aftermath of the rhetoric.

Each situation was distinct. The

situations occurred in a time period of almost twenty-five years. Two of the presidents
were Republicans and two were Democrats. Each president in each situation set forth
below had to consider questions, such as: How is American national security
threatened? Is there a humanitarian reason for America to get involved militarily in the
situation? What does history tell us? What sort of sacrifice are Americans willing to
make? What will my legacy be?
In addition to the questions above, each president had to consider the reaction of
Congress and the American public. To be sure, international reaction was important as
well, but Congressional support and domestic public support, which often mirrored each
other, was critical for a number of reasons. For instance, Congress could assist with or
delay funding requests. In addition, while it may have been arguable whether Congress
could stop a presidential decision to order military action, it was easier for the President
if Congress supported the decision. Members of Congress, wishing to be re-elected or
to keep their party in power, looked to the American public for support. The President,
whether or not he was looking to be re-elected, generally had the same political concern
that he not hurt his party. Thus, this thesis, while acknowledging that the President
often has audiences outside of Congress and the American public, focuses on the
interaction between the President and those two audiences specifically.
Three presidents, George H.W. Bush, William Clinton, and George W. Bush,
successfully defined the situation, understood and appealed to the emotions of
members of Congress and the American people and linked logical argument to those
emotions. Those three presidents were successful in advocating for the United States
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to take military action. Barack Obama, in the situation we consider, failed to define the
events as a crisis and initially failed to identify and appeal to the emotions of members
of Congress and the American people. Ultimately, Obama backed away from his
advocacy for the use of military force.
Aristotle’s model of rhetoric proved instructive. In all four cases, Aristotle’s
character of the speaker was important, but not as important as it may have been during
Aristotle’s time. Character meant different things depending upon the President:
personal character, honesty, experience, or even the prestige of the office of the
Presidency itself. Logic was also important. All four post-Cold War presidents used
logical arguments to advocate for the use of military force, including arguments based
on morality, humanitarian grounds, history and other themes. However, the most critical
piece of Aristotle’s model for each President who was advocating for the use of military
force was emotion. Admittedly, elements of logical arguments often also evoked strong
emotions. Words chosen by the President to define a situation so that there were
logical arguments for the use of military force often were emotionally charged words.
This overlap between logic and emotion supports the argument made below: the
President had to understand and appeal to the emotions of the audience in order to
successfully advocate for the use of military force. The importance of character
diminished and the logical arguments became so much stronger when the President
was able to understand and appeal to emotion.
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Chapter I: Desert Storm: Exorcising the Legacy of Vietnam and Setting the Course for
Future United States Military Involvement Abroad

On March 6, 1991, President George H.W. Bush addressed a joint session of
Congress to celebrate the end of the Persian Gulf War.1 In front of a huge hanging
American flag, and in front of lawmakers, each of whom had a small American flag
sticking out of his or her front pocket, President Bush announced to members of
Congress, and to the American people and to the world that the war was over. In the
midst of congratulating Secretary of State James Baker and Generals Colin Powell and
Norman Schwarzkopf and others, President Bush acknowledged the Ambassador of
Kuwait in the gallery and exclaimed, “Kuwait is free.”2
This speech was, in essence, a victory lap for President Bush following the
relatively easy and painless winning of the Persian Gulf War. It was symbolic of
winning, patriotism and pride. This address, like most of President Bush’s rhetoric
surrounding the Persian Gulf War, though, spoke of more than simply the war in Kuwait.
In defining Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and America’s response, President Bush stressed
two themes. These themes carry throughout Bush’s initial address announcing Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait and all the way through the victory address noted above.
The first theme addressed a vanquishing of Vietnam. Desert Storm presented an
opportunity for President Bush, and for many Americans, not to forget necessarily, but
to move beyond the less than successful – some argue disastrous – American military
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involvement in Vietnam. The United States military had not been inactive with its
military around the world in the approximately twenty years since the Vietnam War - for instance, in “Operation Just Cause” in 1989 President Bush had ordered
approximately 24,000 troops into Panama to assist with deposing Panamanian general
and dictator Manuel Noriega - - but, to President Bush, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and
potential invasion of Saudi Arabia, represented an ideal moment for the United States to
flex its military muscle and regain some of its influence and credibility on the
international stage in what Bush apparently considered another just cause.
The second theme looked to the future. Given that the United States had not
utilized its military in such a major way in twenty years, the Persian Gulf War presented
President Bush and the American people, as represented by Congress, with the
opportunity to chart how and when and under what circumstances the United States
could and would utilize military force abroad in the now post-Cold War world. Many
Americans and many lawmakers wanted to avoid “another Vietnam” situation where war
had been not really declared and America’s military mission had not really been defined
and President Johnson and President Nixon had made a number of seemingly unilateral
decisions. Ultimately, President Bush saw this situation as an opportunity to define the
broader course of United States military involvement internationally in the future,
beyond the Persian Gulf War.
Recall Windt and Zarefsky who wrote, among other things, that presidential
rhetoric was “situational” and that the power of the president was to define a situation.
Before examining President Bush’s Persian Gulf War rhetoric, therefore, it is necessary
to understand what the situation was in the United States in 1990 when Iraq invaded
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Kuwait. Once the backdrop situation is better understood, we can then turn to the
presidential rhetoric itself surrounding the Persian Gulf War, and how that rhetoric
shaped the situation and the American response. In considering the situation and the
rhetoric, we will pay close attention to the elements of persuasion as set forth by
Aristotle: the character of President Bush, the logical arguments he made, and whether
he understood and appealed to the emotions of his audience. Finally, we consider the
public and Congressional response to the Persian Gulf War and look at some of the
legacies of Bush’s Persian Gulf War rhetoric.

A: The Situation: President Bush’s Character
A significant part of the situation leading into the Persian Gulf War was President
George H.W. Bush himself. Aristotle stated that one way to achieve persuasion was
through the character of the speaker himself. United States Presidents, by virtue of the
prestige of the office alone, are granted a certain amount of authority and deference. In
other words, the office imbues a President with a certain amount of character.
However, character may or may not mean personal character. President Bush,
however, was acknowledged for his personal character, primarily based on his
experience, as well as the character imbued by the office. By the time he was elected
president in the fall of 1988, Bush had had a long and distinguished political career,
primarily in Washington, D.C. He had served in the House of Representatives in the
late 1960s. He had been Ambassador to the United Nations. He had been Chief of the
Liaison Office to the People’s Republic of China. He had been the Director of Central
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Intelligence in the mid-1970s and, of course, Vice President under Ronald Reagan
during the 1980s.
Equally important to his political experience, however, was Bush’s military
experience. President Bush had served with distinction, earning the Distinguished
Flying Cross and other military honors, during the Second World War. This was a
critical part of Bush’s persona because, as we shall see, Bush used the history of World
War II in his rhetoric about the Gulf War. Bush made important parallels in his rhetoric
between Hitler and his aggression in Europe in World War II and Saddam Hussein and
his aggression in Kuwait during 1990. Hitler overran Belgium much in the way that
Hussein overran Kuwait. Many Americans of President Bush’s generation had fought in
World War II and thought of World War II as the good war, with United States
participation justified. Most Americans also felt that the United States had been
victorious in World War II. Bush attempted in his rhetoric to invoke that same
justification and pride in support of United States involvement in the Gulf War.

B: The Situation: President Bush’s Relationship with Congress and the American
People
When the Gulf War began, President Bush was relatively popular with the
American public, but had an uneasy relationship with Congress, including some
members of his own party. Bush won the 1988 election, defeating the Democrat
nominee, Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts, with a little over 53% of the
popular vote, but about 79% of the electoral vote.3 During 1989, the first year of his
presidency, the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe began to have holes and, in a very real
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and symbolic way, the Berlin Wall came down. Germany reunited in 1990 and retained
its membership in NATO. The Soviet Union’s power was rapidly declining, though
President Bush maintained close, personal ties to Mikhail Gorbachev and saw the
Soviet Union as a potentially valuable international ally. Domestically, President Bush
publicly sparred with Congress about the best ways to address a sluggish economy and
deficits left over from President Ronald Reagan’s administration. In the end, President
Bush was forced by a Congress controlled by Democrats to enact some new taxes,
which did not please Republicans. Thus, Bush’s relationship with Congress in 1990
was strained overall, even on the Republican side of the aisle.
President Bush was relatively popular outside of Washington, D.C., in the months
prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in early August 1990, but his popularity had been
declining in Gallup Polls since a high approval rating of 73% in February of 1990. 4
Domestic issues, primarily centered on the growing deficit and less than robust
economy, were proving difficult to overcome and were concerns for most Americans.
By June 1990 Bush’s approval rating was 69% and by July 1990 it was 60%. 5 The polls
were not complete reviews of President Bush’s job performance, but demonstrated that
the number of respondents to the polls who approved of the job President Bush was
doing as President at the time had declined from almost three-fourths of the
respondents to three-fifths of the respondents. Still, even as Iraq invaded Kuwait,
President Bush enjoyed a 60% approval rating, which was still quite strong.
Thus, the situation leading into Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, which
precipitated the response by President Bush and the United States in the form of Desert
Shield in August 1990, and then Desert Storm in February 1991, was that, domestically,
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Bush enjoyed strong popularity with the public and an uneasy relationship with
Congress. Public feelings about the international situation were positive. There was
optimism about the end of the Cold War. The Berlin Wall had been torn down and
Germany was negotiating its reunification. The Soviet Union was on its last legs,
though; just as importantly, Bush saw Gorbachev and a new Russia was seen as a
potentially strong international ally for the United States. President Bush “basked in the
success” of three international summit meetings in a six-week span during 1990,
including meetings with Gorbachev, with leaders of the Group of Seven industrial
countries, and with NATO heads of government.6
Initially, the Persian Gulf War only increased Bush’s popularity. Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait provided a situation on which Americans could focus that, while certainly
political, was not as divisive as the domestic economy. Most Americans wanted the
president to do something in response to Iraq’s invasion. Within about a week after
President Bush’s address on August 8, 1990, outlining the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and
America’s response7, including a trade embargo and other economic sanctions against
Iraq, discussions with world leaders, United Nations sanctions, and deployment of
troops to Saudi Arabia at the request of Saudi Arabia, Bush’s popularity was up to as
high as 76%.8
Another part of the situation leading into Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and largely
unknown by many Americans, was Saddam Hussein’s working relationship with
President Reagan and, later, President Bush. Saddam Hussein had enjoyed a
beneficial relationship with the Reagan administration of the 1980s, including working
with then Vice President Bush during Iraq’s war with Iran, which included loans
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guaranteed by the United States and the right to purchase United States arms. 9 The
relationship had continued off and on during the first two years of President Bush’s
presidency, though it had been strained when Saddam Hussein attacked the Kurds in
northern Iraq, using, in part, arms supplied by the United States. In addition, some of
the weapons utilized by the Iraqi army in the invasion of Kuwait had been American
provided or American funded. Based on this relationship, while Saddam Hussein may
well have expected a public show of extreme consternation from the United States in
reaction to his invasion of Kuwait, he probably did not expect the extent of President
Bush’s response and the threat and use of military force.

C: The Rhetoric
President Bush addressed United States military involvement in the Gulf War a
number of times, using his rhetoric to skillfully define the situation and characterize
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait . Bush used Aristotle’s methods of persuasion - - character,
logic and appeal to emotion - - in order to advocate for his preferred policy of United
States military involvement in the Gulf: initially to establish a defensive posture by
amassing troops in Saudi Arabia and American naval vessels in the Gulf, and, later, to
attack Iraq and drive its forces out of Kuwait.
This chapter focuses on three important speeches in which President Bush both
characterized what was happening in Kuwait and advocated for increasing United
States military action. First, Bush addressed the nation on August 8, 1990, following
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Second, Bush addressed the nation on January 16, 1991,
updating the nation only hours after the United States had joined in air strikes against
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Iraqi targets. Third, Bush addressed Iraq during his January 29, 1991, State of the
Union address. This third address reiterated some of the same themes that President
Bush had already set forth, but was very important because, with members of Congress
present, and occasionally on their feet applauding, the speech finally demonstrated a
unified American response and Congressional support for President Bush. As will be
discussed below, Bush had in January 1991 just finished a three months’ long battle
with Congress about whether he had unilateral authority to involve the United States
military in the Gulf War or needed Congressional approval. That question was put to
bed with the portion of the State of the Union address devoted to the Gulf War.
These three addresses also share Bush’s recurring use of history to appeal to
the emotions of the American public. Mark A. Pollack, currently a professor at Temple
University, argued in an essay, recalling Windt, that presidents shape the facts of a
situation in order to define a situation. Pollack further argued that presidents use
“historical allusions” and “historical analogies” to marshal public support.10 The use of
history, in particular historical symbols of which there is a “collective understanding,”
Pollack argued, had a significant emotional impact and “legitimized” a president’s
decisions.11 By using the collective American memory of World War II, and in particular
comparing Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler, President Bush was able to appeal to
emotions shared by most Americans to legitimize his decision to attack Iraqi forces and
Iraqi targets. As we will see in subsequent chapters, President Bush was just the first of
the post-Cold War presidents to use history to appeal to the logic and, more importantly,
emotions of his listeners.
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i.

Address to the nation, August 8, 1990

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops rolled into Kuwait and quickly took control.
President Bush addressed the nation on August 8, 1990. Stating that in the “life of a
nation,” sometimes we are “called upon to define who we are and what we believe,”
President Bush utilized his presidential power of rhetoric to define the situation, in this
case Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.12

President Bush outlined American interests in

becoming involved, including the big economic interest of oil, and the interest of regional
stability, but these logical arguments came later in the speech. He began his
characterization of the invasion by calling it a “blitzkrieg” and an “outrageous and brutal
act of aggression.”13 Though perhaps not the best public speaker, Bush effectively
chose charged words with historical significance to appeal to the emotions of his
listeners. He decidedly did not recall the Vietnam War, a legacy he was trying to get
past, but instead recalled the “good war,” World War II, a war in which most Americans
agreed that Hitler and Nazism must be stopped. Bush stated that, “A puppet regime
imposed from the outside is unacceptable.”14 With the words “puppet regime,”
President Bush did not need to refer directly to Hitler or to the Soviet Union, but just by
evoking Hitler and the Soviet Union, Bush stuck with a post-World War II, Cold War
theme that could be agreed upon and embraced by most Americans.
Bush more directly recalled Hitler again later, exclaiming that, “Appeasement
does not work.”15 The use of the word, “appeasement” was a referral to the 1930s
European and American policy with Hitler. In addition, Bush stated bluntly that, “As was
the case in the 1930's, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening

22

his neighbors.”16 President Bush’s meaning was clear. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was
like Germany’s invasion of its neighbors in the 1930s, and Saddam Hussein was like
Adolf Hitler. This historical appeal had elements of logic, but was clearly an appeal to
the emotions of most Americans.
Only later in the speech did President Bush make a more logical argument,
setting forth the American interests put at risk by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Bush
acknowledged that the United States imported about half of its oil, so oil, and with it, the
“economic freedom” of the United States was the primary interest served by the United
States doing anything in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.17 Bush argued that
the United States had other interests as well. For instance, noting that the world was
“beginning a new era,” apparently referring to the end of the Cold War, Bush
emphasized the importance of keeping the peace in the Middle East.18 Noting the “vital”
interest to the United States of an independent and sovereign Saudi Arabia, Bush
emphasized the “long” United States friendship with Saudi Arabia and the importance of
Saudi Arabia to regional stability and as a deterrence to further Iraqi aggression.19 In
addition, Iraq’s invasion provided the United States the opportunity to regain some of
the prestige and international standing it had lost during the Vietnam War, though Bush
did not explicitly state this.
Donald Neuchterlein, a political scientist who has authored a number of books on
American foreign policy, identified similar of the United States affected by Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait. Neuchterlein argued that the economic interest represented by oil
and the interest in a favorable (new) world order were of highest ranking “vital” interest
to the United States and that the interest of “promoting American values” through
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defending a non-aggressor nation against a clear aggressor was a lesser, but still
“major” interest.20 Thus, oil, promotion of a new world order including stability in the
Middle East, and the opportunity to regain American standing on the world stage were
all interests.
The American response outlined by Bush in the August 8, 1990 speech
consisted of the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia; the deployment of additional
ships to the Persian Gulf; the enactment of a trade embargo and economic sanctions
against Iraq; and a discussion of communications he had had with various world
leaders, including support from Great Britain, NATO, and the Soviet Union. 21 Bush also
noted that the United Nations had passed a resolution “decrying” the Iraqi attack and
allowing for international sanctions.22 With the American response, Bush defined the
attack as a “world issue” and not just an issue for the United States.
In considering this address within the context of Aristotle’s model of a persuasive
speaker, Bush’s character was not at issue. Bush simply stated that he came to the
nation, “as President.” Bush, however, came to the nation with a lengthy and
distinguished background in politics and in Washington, D.C., and the public popularity
and trust that accompanied that background. This popularity and trust, combined with
the character imbued by the office of the Presidency, made Bush a formidable advocate
for a military response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Bush also used logic to persuade
his listeners, successfully identifying American interests and explaining why the United
States had to respond. However, while character and logic were important, President
Bush’s understanding of and appeal to the emotions of the American people and
members of Congress was even more important. By utilizing specific references to
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Hitler and World War II, and by carefully avoiding references to Vietnam, Bush paved
the way for an initial positive response by the American public and put Congress on
notice that he would advocate for a military response.

ii.

Address to the nation on January 16, 1991

President Bush addressed the nation on January 16, 1991 hours after “allied”
forces began air strikes on targets in Kuwait and Iraq. This was the first direct
engagement of Iraqi forces following five months of economic sanctions against Iraq,
warnings to Iraq, and waiting. During the brief address, President Bush both listed
logical reasons why the decision to attack had been made and appealed to the
emotions of the American public and Congress. He also continued his themes of
differentiating this situation and military involvement from the situation in Vietnam and of
looking to the future.
The logic of the attack was that all reasonable efforts had been made to
persuade Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait and all reasonable efforts had failed.
Sanctions had been tried for five months and had failed.23 Secretary of State James
Baker had attended a meeting in Geneva and had been totally “rebuffed.” 24 The
Secretary General of the United Nations had tried twice to reason with Saddam
Hussein, and had just made a “last-ditch” effort to prevail upon Saddam Hussein to
withdraw from Kuwait and had failed.25 The United States had tried to be reasonable.
President Bush also significantly noted that Iraq was a military threat not only to
American interests in the Middle East and the interests of American allies, but
potentially also to the United States directly. According to Bush, in addition to a “vast
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arsenal” of weapons, Iraq had chemical weapons and, most importantly, a nuclear
weapon that had to be destroyed.26 President Bush left no doubt that the United States
and its allies had to attack Iraqi forces and targets and had to do it then in order to
control this threat. Bush’s mention of a nuclear threat in the hands of an out-of-control
nation such as Iraq appealed both to the logic of the attack and the emotions of the
American public. Mention of the nuclear threat recalled the Soviet nuclear threat and
the legacy of the just ended Cold War. .
President Bush, however, also made other emotional appeals to the American
public and members of Congress. Bush, using emotionally charged language, stated
that Iraq had “raped, pillaged and plundered” a tiny nation. 27 Iraq had committed
“unspeakable atrocities.”28 Iraq had “maimed and murdered children.”29 The acts
committed by Saddam Hussein and Iraq were akin to the atrocities committed by Hitler
and the Nazis, and so, Saddam had to be stopped.
At the same time, President Bush tried mightily to differentiate this attack on Iraqi
forces and targets from the United States involvement in Vietnam. “I've told the
American people before that this will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here
tonight.”30 The United States was not acting on its own when it attacked Iraqi targets.
This attack was taken “in accord with United Nations resolutions and with the consent of
the United States Congress.”31 Unlike the sometimes muddled objectives in Vietnam,
the objectives in the Gulf were clear: “Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The
legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and Kuwait will
once again be free.”32 Ground forces from the United States and its allies were not
engaged in the battle.33 By not employing ground forces at this time, President Bush
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implied that casualties would be fewer, and that there was a much smaller chance of
getting pulled into a drawn-out war as had occurred in Vietnam.
The address also continued President Bush’s theme of looking forward to the
future, what Bush called a “new world order.” President Bush stated that he envisioned
a new world order where “the rule of law, not the rule of the jungle” governed the
conduct of nations.34 Again, Bush was referring to and moving beyond the jungles of
Vietnam. In addition, Bush said he envisioned a new world order “in which a credible
United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the
U.N.'s founders.”35 With the significant weakening of the Soviet Union and the Cold
War at an end, Bush implied that the often criticized United Nations could now finally
fulfill its role without having its members being forced to choose to align with the United
States or the Soviet Union. With the Cold War over, Bush saw an opportunity with the
Persian Gulf War and attempted to define and characterize the War as a war for the
future. As one author put it, Bush saw that with the Gulf War, America could act as an
“agent of change.”36
The themes raised in this January 16, 1991address paralleled the themes raised
in Bush’s August 8, 1990, address immediately following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
President Bush successfully invoked an emotional response by comparing Hussein’s
invasion and occupation of Kuwait to Hitler’s invasion and occupation of so many
European countries in World War II. Bush successfully set forth the logic in the United
States response by noting American interests. Bush also wanted to further his agenda
of a new world order by offering his view of the future, a view where these kinds of
unprovoked attacks did not occur. In addition, Bush reminded Americans that this was
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not Vietnam. The difference though between this address and the address immediately
following Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait was that the United States military
response had increased significantly. Immediately following Iraq’s invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, the United States had taken up a defensive position in
neighboring Saudi Arabia and had deployed naval vessels to the Gulf. Now, however,
the United States military had moved from Saudi Arabia into Kuwait. The United States
began air strikes and launched missiles at Iraqi targets. Ground troops were about to
engage with Iraqi troops in Kuwait. Thus, President Bush not only reiterated his
themes, but strengthened them to justify the increased United States military response.

iii.

State of the Union, January 29, 1991

In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 1991, less than two weeks
after his January 16, 1991, address to the nation, President Bush again reiterated, but
also elaborated on some of these same themes. For instance, Bush stated that America
had a “responsibility” to be involved militarily in the Persian Gulf War.
As Americans, we know that there are times when we must step forward
and accept our responsibility to lead the world away from the dark chaos
of dictators, toward the brighter promise of a better day. Almost 50 years
ago we began a long struggle against aggressive totalitarianism. Now we
face another defining hour for America and the world.37
President Bush accomplished a lot in this one sentence. He invoked the legacy of Hitler
by noting the “dark chaos of dictators.” He noted an American responsibility to act, by
referring back 50 years to American action during World War II. He also looked to the
future and his vision for a new world order. Most Americans agreed, at least after World
War II, that Americans had a responsibility to do something to fight Hitler and that
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becoming involved in World War II had been the “responsible” and right thing to do.
Bush not only asked for this memory to be applied to the Gulf War, but also used the
Gulf War as an opportunity to look ahead.
Later in the address, President Bush called America a “catalyst for peace” in the
region and said its responsibility would not end with the end of the war, but would carry
on to the future.38 Because, Bush claimed,
What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new
world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause
to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—peace and security,
freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle and
worthy of our children's future.39
These themes and this State of the Union address were important because, as
noted above, President Bush and some members of Congress had fought a very public
battle over three or four months about whether Congressional approval of President
Bush’s decision to involve the United States military in the Gulf War was necessary. As
we will see below, ultimately President Bush requested – sort of – Congressional
approval of military action and Congress granted approval. However, Congressional
approval had only been granted hours before United States airstrikes began and United
States troops moved in, so this was the first opportunity for President Bush to appear
with together with Congress to show the American people and the world a united
response by the United States administration and Congress.
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D: Congressional and Public Response
i.

Was Congressional approval of military action necessary?

President Bush had an uneasy relationship with Congress at the time of the
outset of the Gulf War. Because 1990 was a mid-term election year, however, both
President Bush and Congress proceeded cautiously in the response to Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait. President Bush had deployed thousands of troops to Saudi Arabia in August
of 1990 and had ordered United States naval vessels to the Gulf. Prior to the mid-term
election, because Bush had ordered troops to Saudi Arabia in a defensive posture,
Congress was generally “compliant,” passing resolutions of support for the build-up.40
Congressional approval was not really an issue prior to the mid-term election. However,
immediately after the mid-term elections, on November 8, 1990, Bush ordered 200,000
additional troops to Saudi Arabia.41 This large build-up allowed the United States to be
in a position to take a more offensive role in the Gulf as opposed to the defensive role it
had taken to date. The build-up was also ordered by the Administration without the
consent of Congress.
The Constitution grants Congress, and not the President, the power to declare
war.42 Some have argued that President Bush was ready to attack Iraqi forces with or
without Congressional approval and that the Persian Gulf War was a “test” of who had
what “war powers.”43 Senator Sam Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia, and chair of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, held a series of hearings in late November and
early December of 1990 to discuss this issue. Nunn and certain other Democrats were
skeptical of Bush’s build-up. President Bush, whatever his own feelings on what
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powers he had to order the build-up and possibly an attack, had wisely left open the
door for cooperation with Congress in his rhetoric.
In his initial address to the American public on August 8, 1990, President Bush
did not mention the role of Congress. He appealed directly to the American people and
urged support for his decision to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia and to take other
economic measures against Iraq. This caused members of Congress from both parties
some concern. However, in an address to a Joint Session of Congress on September
11, 1990, President Bush made sure to include Congress in the decision-making
process44, or at least he realized the importance of lobbying for Congress’s support of
his own decisions.
President Bush used his September 11, 1990, address to lobby Congress. He
started by extolling the wonderful contributions of “every soldier, sailor, marine, and
airman” serving in the Gulf, and thanking the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Powell, and thanking the commander in the field, General Schwarzkopf, and
thanking the “men and women of the Department of Defense.”45 It would have been
difficult for members of Congress not to join in with their appreciation for the armed
services. Bush then went on to thank all Americans, “especially those here in this
Chamber tonight, for your support for our armed forces and for their mission.”46 In
essence, President Bush attempted to have members of Congress think like Americans
first and rally to the (his) cause and, perhaps, make them feel as though they had
already approved the mission. Thus, though he did not specifically acknowledge that
Congress had the power to determine whether American forces could be sent into
combat in the Persian Gulf – and he did not specifically acknowledge that he himself did
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not have that power – President Bush acknowledged that he needed at least moral
Congressional support, if not formal support.
President Bush also acknowledged that Congress held the purse strings. He
defined America’s military action in the Gulf as a part of the problem the nation was
facing with the budget deficit. In his September 11, 1990, address to a Joint Session of
Congress, Bush stated, “Higher oil prices slow our growth, and higher defense costs
would only make our fiscal deficit problem worse.”47 Bush attempted to tie the Gulf
Crisis into issues with the domestic economy, claiming the Gulf Crisis demonstrated
how “economically vulnerable” the United States was.48 President Bush’s solution, of
course, was for Congress to support the military effort in the Persian Gulf and to bring
about a quick and decisive end to the situation.
Throughout the fall of 1990, President Bush attempted to win members of
Congress over to the idea that the use of direct military force should be an option
without explicitly admitting that he had to have Congressional support for that idea. As
stated above, the Senate Armed Forces Committee held hearings in November and
December. In the House, on December 3, 1990, the House Democratic Caucus
approved a resolution explicitly stating that the President should first seek
Congressional authorization for the use of force, unless American lives were in danger.
There seemed to be many members of Congress who would support use of military
force if only Congress were provided the opportunity to approve the use of force. 49
Ultimately, President Bush sent a letter to leaders of Congress on January 8,
1991. In the letter, President Bush was careful not to say directly that he needed
Congressional support for Constitutional reasons. In fact, there was no mention of the
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Constitution. Instead, Bush claimed if Congress were to “go on record” supporting the
position of the United Nations Security Council, which had recently passed a resolution
authorizing all use of force against Saddam Hussein, then that action would “greatly
enhance the chances for peace.”50 In addition, Bush stated, “it would also help dispel
any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq’s leaders that the United States lacks the
necessary unity” to use military force.51 Thus, President Bush’s appeal was two-fold.
He asked members of Congress to demonstrate that the United States stood with the
world community by supporting the United Nations resolution. He asked members of
Congress to demonstrate that the United States leadership was united in the cause.
There were hearings in the House and Senate over the next few days following
delivery of the letter. In the end, the “Persian Gulf Resolution” supporting use of all
necessary force was passed by margins of 250-183 in the House and 53-47 in the
Senate. Members of Congress were careful to include language in the resolution
retaining for themselves the power to declare war, thus the issue was not really settled.
One scholar, writing in 1994, argued President Bush’s distinction between asking for
“support” for the use of military force and asking for “authorization” for the use of military
support was not a real distinction.52 He argued further that the resolution signaled a
“restoration of the pre-1950” understanding that Congress had the power to declare
war.53 Based on the carefully chosen language in his letter to Congress, President
Bush would certainly have disagreed.
History proved that the issue was still up for debate. While one legacy of the
Persian Gulf War rhetoric may be the necessity to include Congress in decisions to use
military force, another legacy may be that there is a grey area. Apparently, there are
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situations where a post-Cold War president may choose to use military force without
direct support or consent or authorization of Congress. As will be discussed below,
Presidents William Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama all wrestled with the
issue at different times and in different ways.
Following the resolution of support from the House and Senate, President Bush
wasted no time. On January 16, 1991, United States war planes attacked Iraqi forces
and Iraqi targets in Kuwait and in Iraq. Ground forces attacked in late February of 1990.
Five days after American tanks rolled out of Saudi Arabia and into Kuwait, the Iraqi
army was routed and Kuwait was liberated. In a February 27, 1991, address to the
American people, President Bush proudly exclaimed, “Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is
defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis,
in control of their own destiny.”54

ii.

Public opinion

Most Americans experienced the Gulf War in a different way than they had
experienced any war in the past. Cable news, in particular CNN, offered news
coverage 24/7 that was accessible to most Americans. To be sure, the military carefully
chose what images to release or what video to share, but cable television brought the
war to almost everyone. In addition, the military was able to show off modern military
technology. Apache attack helicopters, F-15 fighter bombers, and Tomahawk missiles
launched from United States naval vessels in the Gulf were all on display.
Patriotism surged. Lee Greenwood’s song, “God Bless the USA” played on the
radio. There were victory parades in New York City and Washington, D.C. Secretary of

34

Defense, Dick Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, were
mentioned as possible candidates for President. General Norman Schwarzkopf was a
hero. People expressing faith in President Bush’s administration rose to incredible
heights.
President Bush had always had solid presidential approval ratings. However,
with the Gulf War, and particularly the winning of the Gulf War, the approval ratings
went into unheard of territory. As noted above, when Iraq first invaded Kuwait and
President Bush outlined the then defensive response of the United States, President
Bush’s approval ratings jumped from a solid 60% in mid-July 1990 to 75% in midAugust 1990.55 Then the approval ratings slid down to a still solid, but lower 53% to
58% range, while America waited to see what Saddam Hussein would do. 56 This period
in October, November and early December of 1990 was also when President Bush was
sparring with Congress over the issue of whether he wanted Congressional “support” for
using direct military force or whether he needed Congressional “approval” for that
decision. Once Congress passed its resolution approving the use of military force and
President Bush ordered the attack, Bush’s approval rating shot up to an incredible 82%
in mid-January of 1991.57 President Bush’s approval rating crested at an unheard of
89% in late February and early March of 1991 following the quick and decisive military
victory in the Gulf War by United States and coalition forces.58
President Bush’s approval rating did not last. It dropped steadily until reaching a
low of 29% in mid-July, and it had only rebounded to about 34% in mid-October,
heading into the presidential election of 1992.59 Americans clearly enjoyed and
approved of the Gulf War. Perhaps the biggest surprise of the 1992 campaign was “the
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lack of bounce” that President Bush received.60 Bush, of course, lost the 1992
presidential election to William Clinton, with domestic issues taking precedence.
Scholars have advanced a number of theories about why the clear effect of the Gulf
War on the American public did not last. Perhaps the war was too short. The outcome
was not in doubt. There were very few casualties. Modern technology made it often
appear almost like a video game. Most Americans were not asked to suffer or make
personal sacrifice or to participate in the war effort. So, maybe Americans did not share
in the war as in other wars.61 Perhaps, some Americans felt that the war left unfinished
business with Saddam Hussein and Iraq, which of course turned out to be the case.
Whatever the reasons for the American public’s short memory with regard to the
successes of the Persian Gulf War, there were some important legacies coming from
Bush’s rhetoric. First and foremost, one of President Bush’s themes in his rhetoric was
to move America beyond Vietnam. He succeeded. As David Halberstam put it, the
“Gulf War showed that the American military had recovered from the malaise of the
Vietnam debacle.”62 America was not rejuvenated in just a military sense, though. The
lessons of the Gulf War extended in a larger psychological sense to a broader national
view of American abilities.63 Or more simply put, “We were back.”64 This legacy proved
important to the post-Cold War presidents who followed Bush. President Bush’s other
major theme in his Gulf War rhetoric was about building a new world order. History
ultimately denied that legacy. The balance of power in the world had changed and
continued to change with the end of the Cold War, but new challenges arose. President
Bush’s new world order envisioned a world where nations worked with each other,
ensuring each other’s security, but what about new nations that had formed and were
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still forming because of the end of the Cold War? What about rogue leaders? What
about countries in which civil wars broke out upon ethnic or religious grounds? What
about groups that transcended national boundaries?
We consider next President William Clinton’s handling of a situation involving a
rogue leader, a civil war based on ethnic and religious grounds, and a “new” nation
formed at the close of the Cold War.
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Chapter II: Bombing Kosovo: A Humanitarian Mission and the Opportunity to Avoid a
Third World War

President William Clinton addressed the American people from the White House
on June 10, 1999, during prime time television hours to announce that the 79-day
bombing of Kosovo by the United States and NATO allies had stopped and had been
successful. Serbian paramilitary forces, led by Slobodan Milosevic, had retreated, and
a cease-fire had been achieved. Like President George H.W. Bush had done before
him at the conclusion of the Gulf War, President Clinton, in essence, was taking a
victory lap. The United States involvement in the military action had consisted entirely
of air strikes and missile launches from naval vessels and submarines. No United
States ground troops had been utilized. No American lives were lost. American and
NATO goals had been achieved.
As was the case with the Gulf War rhetoric of George H.W. Bush, one of
President Clinton’s overarching arguments for United States involvement in the Kosovo
bombings was that the United States had a responsibility to the rest of the world.
President Clinton also stressed two specific arguments for United States involvement:
humanitarian reasons and avoidance of a larger scale war. The arguments contained
both elements of logic and emotion, but ultimately relied on appealing to the emotions of
Americans. The arguments used ideas similar to ideas stressed by President Bush in
advocating for the use of military force in the Gulf War, but the arguments as expressed
by President Clinton contained variations. The variations are important to
understanding President Clinton’s policy for United States military involvement in that
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post-Cold War period. Understanding that the situation in Kosovo presented some
different elements than were present in the Gulf War situation, President Clinton both
borrowed and built upon President Bush’s policies and ideas, but he also charted some
new territory.
The first theme stressed by President Clinton in his June 10, 1999, address was
that the Kosovo bombings were carried out for humanitarian reasons. It could be
argued that humanitarian reasons as a basis for military intervention had logical
elements, but this was essentially an argument meant to appeal to the emotions of
Americans. Clinton wanted Americans to empathize with the people in Kosovo and to
realize that others around the world were too. Clinton stated in his victory speech that,
“The one million men, women, and children driven from their land are preparing to
return home. The demands of an outraged and united international community have
been met.”1
As was the situation in the Gulf War, a rogue leader, here Slobodan Milosevic,
was involved. President Bush dealt with Saddam Hussein of Iraq in the Gulf War and
President Clinton dealt with Milosevic. Both rogue leaders had attacked innocent
people. However, here, Milosevic was not attacking another nation, but rather was
attacking inhabitants of his own country. The primary reasons had to do with the
ethnicity of these people, although religion also played a role. Thus, President Clinton
used the inappropriate aggression of an out-of-control leader as justification for
American involvement in the Kosovo bombings, but here the situation was different than
the situation in Iraq because the United States was intervening in what was really an
internal or civil war.
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In addition, it was only since World War II, and the subsequent realization of the
enormity of the Holocaust, that Americans would have even considered entering a war
for “humanitarian” reasons, especially a war happening in another country. President
Clinton followed President Bush’s lead by invoking history, specifically the legacy of
World War II. Clinton believed that what most Americans felt was the justified role that
the United States took in stopping Hitler was justification for United States involvement
in the Kosovo bombings. Clinton, however, was also attempting to create a crucial
differentiation between the situations in World War II and Kosovo. In the Second World
War, the United States and most of the world did not know until the very end of the war
or even after the war the extent of the atrocities being committed. In Kosovo, Clinton
was arguing that American involvement earlier could prevent atrocities from occurring.
President Clinton could also look to very recent history right in the same region in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milosevic had committed a number of atrocities during the
civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the early and mid-1990s. Clinton clearly had
Milosevic’s prior actions in mind, and was hoping to avoid similar actions in Kosovo,
when making his argument for participating in the bombings in Kosovo. The United
States had hesitated to become involved in that earlier conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina with one result being, according to Clinton’s thinking, that tens of
thousands of innocent people died.2
The second theme stressed by President Clinton in his June 10, 1999, address
following the Kosovo bombings was that the Kosovo bombings were necessary to avoid
a larger scale conflict in the region. Clinton was proud to report, “Finally, we have
averted the wider war this conflict might well have sparked.”3 This too was an echo of
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one of President Bush’s arguments for coming to the aid of Kuwait in the Gulf War, and,
like Bush’s argument, Clinton’s argument to engage in order to avert a larger regional
crisis had elements appealing to both logic and emotion. However, Clinton’s argument
for intervening in Kosovo was necessarily more complex because the situation was
more complex.
In the Gulf War, the aggressors and the victims were easy to identify. The Iraqis
came into Kuwait and took control of the country away from the Kuwaitis. In Kosovo, a
province of Serbia, the war was largely a civil war, though both sides had international
support. The conflict came about as Serbian nationalists were trying to quell not always
peaceful protests by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, who were citizens of Serbia, but who
were used to a certain amount of autonomy and who were supported by a number of
outside nations. Clinton’s argument was that absent United States military intervention,
the conflict could spread to the entire Eastern European region.
This was essentially a logical argument, but also appealed to the emotions of
many Americans. Like Bush before him, President Clinton invoked history to make his
emotional appeal. The theme of avoiding a broader conflict resonated with many
Americans, and certainly with Europeans, because the assassination of Archduke
Ferdinand in Sarajevo by Bosnian Serbs thought to be supported by an independent
Serbia in 1914 was popularly believed to have been a catalyst for World War I.
Sarajevo and Kosovo are located in the same region. Serbian aggression was again
potentially threatening regional stability. President Clinton was concerned that Serbian
nationalism, which had sparked the First World War, might spark another broader war.
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He believed, probably correctly, that Americans and NATO allies did not want another
world war to start in Eastern Europe.
To fully understand President Clinton’s policy of United States involvement in the
Kosovo bombings, one needs to look back at and appreciate the United States’
involvement in the broader conflict in the region, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
during the early and mid-1990s. During his June 10, 1999, Kosovo victory lap speech
cited above, President Clinton referenced the end of a “10-year campaign of
repression”4 by Slobodan Milosevic in an attempt to convey that the American decision
to participate in the Kosovo bombings grew out of a series of events that occurred over
a number of years. Of course, the situation in Serbia and Kosovo had developed not
just over several years, but over centuries. In particular, by understanding President
Clinton’s policy and rhetoric addressing United States involvement in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, especially during the period 1992-1995, we can see how President
Clinton’s policy and rhetoric addressing the bombings in Kosovo fit into a broader
context and plan to address the instability in Eastern Europe. As in the prior chapter,
we shall look first at the context surrounding Kosovo, meaning President Clinton’s
situation domestically and the situation in Kosovo. Then we can examine how
presidential rhetoric helped shape that situation for the American public. Finally, we can
look at how the public and Congressional responded to the decision to participate in the
bombings in Kosovo.
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A: The Situation: President Clinton’s Character
President Clinton was elected in 1992 with only 43% of the popular vote, less
than a majority and only a 6% margin of victory in the popular vote over George H.W.
Bush. Independent candidate Ross Perot won just below 19% of the popular vote, still
a significant number of votes. However, Clinton won 370 electoral votes to 168
electoral votes for Bush.5 The Democrats had a majority in Congress as well following
the 1992 election, with Democrats in the House holding a 258-176 margin and
Democrats in the Senate holding a 57-43 majority.6 Thus, President Clinton was
popular, though with less than a majority of the popular vote, and he had the advantage
of his party holding relatively substantial majorities in the House and Senate. However,
his presidential character leading into his presidency was not without blemish.
First, in contrast to President Bush before him, President Clinton did not have a
long and distinguished record in Washington, D.C. Clinton was young for a President –
only 46 years old – when elected. He was elected in part for being an “outsider,”
uncorrupted by Washington politics, but the only political experience he had at the time
of his inauguration was at the state level as Governor of Arkansas. He did not have a
long list of contacts in Washington to help him initially. He had little professional
international experience. So, while President Clinton brought lots of ideas to the table
to address the economy, health care, education and other domestic issues, his foreign
policy resume was thin at the time he had to address the crisis in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1992. He had a bit more foreign policy experience by the time he was
defending his actions in Kosovo in 1999, but President Clinton was never known as a
great or experienced foreign policy president.
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Second, President Clinton was dogged during his campaign by allegations that
he had dodged the draft during the Vietnam War, and, had instead “fled” to England
while he was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. In fact, President Clinton had
given up his deferment and had been fortunate to receive a very high draft number.
However, his admitted opposition to the Vietnam War, and apparent negative feelings
about the draft, hurt him publicly and politically.7 This contrasts markedly with the
situation of President George H.W. Bush who had not only served in World War II, but
had come under fire and earned distinction.
Governor Clinton famously went on the late evening news program, Nightline,
with Ted Koppel in February 1992 during the presidential campaign to discuss a letter
he had written as a 23-year-old Rhodes Scholar in 1969 to Colonel Eugene Holmes,
who headed up the ROTC program at the University of Arkansas. In the letter, Clinton
thanked the Colonel for “saving” him from the draft. He also stated that no government
“should have the power to make its citizens fight and kill and die in a war they oppose.” 8
Thus, during his presidential campaign, while he tried to distinguish the Vietnam War
from World War II, a war most Americans thought worth fighting, and tried to distinguish
a situation when a draft might not be appropriate from a situation when a draft would be
appropriate, President Clinton had a hard time shaking the label of draft dodger.
Third, President Clinton was dogged by allegations of marital infidelity. During
his campaign, there were a number of allegations of affairs, most prominently from
former Arkansas state employee and part-time lounge singer, Gennifer Flowers. Ms.
Flowers alleged that she and William Clinton had engaged in a twelve-year affair.
During his presidential campaign, then Governor Clinton had gone on national television
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on 60 Minutes with his wife, Hillary, to address the allegations. He did not admit to the
extramarital affair, but stated, “I have acknowledged wrongdoing” and “I have
acknowledged causing pain in my marriage.”9 It was an incomplete answer at best. Of
course, it did not prevent Clinton from being elected as President, but allegations of
marital infidelity and this habit of not quite answering the question directly would catch
up with President Clinton in the year prior to Kosovo, severely damaging his credibility
and, therefore, his character.
By the time President Clinton was urging Americans to support his policy of
United States participation in the bombing of Kosovo in 1999, he was also being
battered politically for his interactions during 1995-1997 with White House intern Monica
Lewinsky. On January 26, 1998, President Clinton, standing with his wife, Hillary, at the
White House categorically denied having sexual relations with “that woman” (Monica
Lewinsky).10 President Clinton later had to recant following testimony by Ms. Lewinsky
before a grand jury about her relationship with him. Ultimately, in August of 1998,
President Clinton was forced to admit an “improper physical relationship” with Monica
Lewinsky. President Clinton’s allegedly false testimony in the scandal with Ms.
Lewinsky led to impeachment hearings as well.
Considering Clinton’s actions within Aristotle’s model, it is clear that Clinton could
not could not rely on his personal character while arguing for United States involvement
in Kosovo in the way that President George H.W. Bush had been able to rely on his
personal character while arguing for United States involvement in the Gulf War. Rather,
President Clinton had to rely in large part on the character imbued by the office of the
President. Importantly, while private actions do often impact public character, President
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Clinton was very adept at keeping his private actions out of the discussions about both
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early and mid-1990s and later in the Kosovo crisis as it
unfolded in 1998 and 1999. It might be too much to argue that President Clinton’s
character played no role in his rhetoric, but, if his character detracted at all from the
power of his rhetoric, Clinton was able to minimize the detraction. He was also
extremely charming. However, without personal character supporting his rhetoric,
President Clinton had to rely even more on the other means of persuasion identified by
Aristotle. Clinton had to make both a logical argument for American military
involvement in the Kosovo bombings and he had to appeal to the emotions of the
American people for support of his policy in Kosovo.

B: The Situation: Eastern Europe
i.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

To understand the situation in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, one has to have at least
a cursory understanding of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as it developed in
the early and mid-1990s, before and immediately subsequent to President Clinton’s
election in November of 1992. Yugoslavia formed following the First World War, but fell
apart during 1991 and 1992. There were many, many ethnicities that comprised
Yugoslavia, and conflict among the various ethnic groups ultimately proved to be too
much. Slovenia and Croatia seceded first. Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded later in
1992. Bosnia and Herzegovina was itself a multi-ethnic nation, comprised of Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims. These three groups clashed, although ultimately, with the
assistance of the United States and others, the Croats and Muslims were able to unite

49

against the Serbs. The Serbs were led by Slobodan Milosevic and supported by the
Yugoslav National Army (JNA). The Serbs also controlled over two-thirds of the land.
Milosevic and the Serbs killed tens of thousands of Croats and Muslims and attempted
to force hundreds of thousands more out of their homes and out of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
George H.W. Bush had not really addressed the problems in the region, calling
the situation a European problem. The United Nations had imposed an embargo on
weapons to the area, but had done little else. President Clinton had campaigned for the
presidency in 1992 with a Bosnia and Herzegovina policy of “lift and strike,” meaning lift
the embargo so that the Croats and Muslims could arm themselves and strike back at
Milosevic and the Serbs. Following his election, President Clinton advocated for a more
active role by the United States and NATO allies. This advocacy helped lead to a
United Nations and United States effort to air-drop food to Bosnian Muslims in 1993
and, ultimately, a United Nations sanctioned “no fly zone” over parts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina primarily enforced by the United States through “Operation Deny Flight.”11
President Clinton, however, unsuccessfully continued to lobby for his “lift and
strike” policy in the United States, and could not achieve a consensus among NATO
members. Meanwhile, the violence continued to escalate. Serbians attacked a United
Nations “safe area” in Srebrenica in June of 1993. Serbians fired a mortar shell into the
Markala marketplace in Sarajevo in February 1994. A United Nations peacekeeper
soldier was killed during a Serbian offensive against the city of Gorazde in April 1994.
An attempted settlement negotiated by former President Jimmy Carter failed in the
spring of 1995. In July 1995, over seven-thousand men, or by some accounts even
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more, were massacred by the Serbs in Srebrenica. Finally, on July 21, 1995, NATO
convened in London and authorized air strikes in response and to try to force an end to
the violence. NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995, which
consisted of a two-week series of airstrikes on Serbian military targets. Cease fire in
Bosnia and Herzegovina finally came in September of 1995.12
Following the cease fire, the Serbs, Croats and Muslims negotiated a tenuous
peace plan at an air force base in Dayton, Ohio, known as the Dayton Accords. The
plan called for a single Bosnia and Herzegovina state, a unified federal government,
free democratic elections and many guarantees of human rights. Most importantly, the
agreement called for an international peacekeeping force, including about one-third
American forces, controlled by NATO. It wasn’t a perfect plan or a perfect peace, but,
as President Clinton noted, it ended “the worst conflict in Europe since World War II.”13
By ending the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, President Clinton and NATO
allies achieved both the humanitarian goal of stopping the slaughter of thousands of
people and the more pragmatic goal of avoiding a larger conflict in the region. These
themes came through in President Clinton’s rhetoric advocating a larger United States
role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and set the stage for Clinton’s advocacy of United
States participation in the Kosovo bombings a few years later in March of 1999.

ii.

Kosovo

Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 was a province of Serbia. The leader of the Serbian
nation was Slobodan Milosevic, and he was a Serb. Most of the residents of Kosovo,
though, were ethnic Albanians. In 1989, Milosevic had stripped Kosovo of its
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constitutional autonomy and attempted to enforce Serbian customs, education and
language requirements. The ethnic Albanians protested over a number of years,
eventually forming the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Clashes between Serbian
paramilitary forces and the KLA grew increasingly violent. The KLA sought outside
support and got it. In 1998, Milosevic ordered Serbian paramilitary forces into Kosovo
to quell what he considered a rebellion by ethnic Albanians. The clashes became even
more violent and the Serbian paramilitary forces began forcing ethnic Albanians out of
their homes, killing some and forcing many to flee as refugees. The civil war in Kosovo
was not an isolated event, but the result of a series of events that had occurred over
centuries, most recently, events that had occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina during
the first half of the 1990s. Perhaps most alarming to President Clinton was that
Milosevic was a primary actor in both the atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and now
the civil war in Kosovo.

C: The Rhetoric
In order to fully understand President Clinton’s rhetoric surrounding the United
States involvement in the Kosovo bombings in March of 1999, some understanding of
Clinton’s rhetoric surrounding Bosnia and Herzegovina is necessary. In many ways,
Clinton’s arguments for a more immediate United States response and involvement in
Kosovo grew out of what Clinton perceived as the failure of the United States to become
involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina earlier. Many of the themes that President Clinton
introduced in defending American involvement in the resolution to the Bosnian war of
the mid-1990s were used by Clinton to justify American involvement in the Kosovo

52

bombings in March of 1999. In this section, we focus on three speeches: President
Clinton’s November 27, 1995, address following the signing of the Dayton Accords that
were supposed to lead to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Clinton’s March 24, 1999,
address at the onset of United States participation in NATO bombings of Kosovo; and
the June 10, 1999, victory speech following the ending of the Kosovo bombings.
These public addresses are not only the most important speeches President
Clinton gave addressing first American military involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and then advocating for American military involvement in Kosovo, but are the only
widely public remarks he made. This may well be due to the perception that President
Clinton was not known or respected as an able and experienced foreign policy president
or to the fact that Clinton had so many domestic and personal issues on his agenda at
the time these conflicts were occurring. Clinton might also have wanted to avoid debate
on United States participation in the Kosovo bombings after the horrors of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. There was only limited information that came from the State Department
and Defense Department regarding the planned bombings in Kosovo. President
Clinton, while leading with his rhetoric in these speeches, left much of the decisionmaking involved with Bosnia and Herzegovina and later with Kosovo to his advisors, as
we will see below.

i.

Bosnia and Herzegovina Rhetoric: Setting the stage for Kosovo with the
November 27, 1995 address to the American people

President Clinton’s Bosnia and Herzegovina rhetoric in November of 1995
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introduced themes and set the stage for his Kosovo rhetoric of 1999. President Clinton
addressed the American people on national television on November 27, 1995, in an
effort to explain why American values and interests “required” that America participate
in the implementation of the Dayton Accords and assist in the peace process in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.14 The themes he set forth were: 1) participation and assistance for
humanitarian reasons, and 2) participation and assistance in order to avoid the ignition
of a larger scale conflict in the region. President Clinton stated in his November 27,
1995, address, “In fulfilling this mission, we will have the chance to help stop the killing
of innocent civilians, especially children, and at the same time, to bring stability to
Central Europe, a region of the world that is vital to our national interests. It is the right
thing to do.”15 These same two themes would later justify President Clinton’s decision
to participate in the bombings of Kosovo.
In discussing the humanitarian justification for United States participation in the
Bosnia and Herzegovina peace process, President Clinton clearly invoked history,
specifically the imagery of World War II Nazi concentration camps, and appealed to the
emotions of Americans.
Horrors we prayed had been banished from Europe forever have been
seared into our minds again: skeletal prisoners caged behind barbed-wire
fences; women and girls raped as a tool of war; defenseless men and
boys shot down into mass graves, evoking visions of World War II
concentration camps; and endless lines of refugees marching toward a
future of despair.16
By invoking the imagery of World War II, a war most Americans agreed had been
necessary to fight in order to defeat the Nazis and the Japanese, and by appealing to
the emotions of the American people by stressing the alleviation of tremendous
suffering, which suffering was graphically described, President Clinton hoped to build
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support for his policy of American involvement in the Bosnian peace process. However,
Clinton also appealed to logic and stressed the more pragmatic goal of avoiding a larger
conflagration in Eastern Europe.
President Clinton argued that though the Cold War was over, the United States
could not afford to look only inward. He stated,
. . . problems that start beyond our borders can quickly become problems
within them. We're all vulnerable to the organized forces of intolerance
and destruction; terrorism; ethnic, religious and regional rivalries; the
spread of organized crime and weapons of mass destruction and drug
trafficking. Just as surely as fascism and communism, these forces also
threaten freedom and democracy, peace and prosperity.17
Note that President Clinton again referenced the “fascism and communism” commonly
associated with World War II, as well as the communism associated with the Cold War.
By invoking history, and specifically fascism and communism, Clinton’s appeal to logic
thus had appeals to emotion as well. He was arguing that these new threats, such as
intolerance, terrorism, and ethnic, religious and regional rivalries, that were all present in
Bosnia and Herzegovina were just as dangerous and need to be stopped before
growing into a bigger conflict. How America responded would set a precedent. And,
lest Americans forget how fragile and important Eastern Europe is, Clinton reminded
Americans that,
Bosnia lies at the very heart of Europe, next-door to many of its fragile
new democracies and some of our closest allies. Generations of
Americans have understood that Europe's freedom and Europe's stability
is vital to our own national security. That's why we fought two wars in
Europe.18
Clinton invoked both World War I, which started in Eastern Europe, and World War II in
his appeal to the American people.
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President Clinton ended the address by recalling a conversation he had with
Pope John Paul II, in which the Pope reportedly said, “I have lived through most of this
century. I remember that it began with a war in Sarajevo. Mr. President, you must not let
it end with a war in Sarajevo.”19 This was another reference to World War I having its
origins in Eastern Europe and an appeal by the Pope to the President and by the
President to the American people to do everything possible to avoid another world war.
Perhaps President Clinton also thought referring to his conversation with the Pope lent
a bit “crusade” mystique to his argument, or thought that referring to the Pope lent a
certain morality to his argument.

ii.

Kosovo: Justifying the Bombings

These same themes and ideas were present four years later, when President
Clinton announced on March 24, 1999, that American forces had joined with other
NATO forces to begin airstrikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo. The reasons for
United States military involvement were familiar:
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a
mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to diffuse a
powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this
century with catastrophic results.20
As was the case with President Clinton’s justification of United States military
involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he stressed the dual themes of humanitarian
responsibility and avoidance of a greater war.
Putting aside the question of whether the members of the primarily ethnic
Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had been truly innocent, there were without
question thousands of civilians of Albanian descent who had died and thousands more
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forced to flee their homes. President Clinton used these facts and appealed to the
emotions of Americans in three ways.
First, he situated Kosovo geographically by explaining that Kosovo was a
province of Serbia, about 160 miles east of Italy, “less than the distance between
Washington and New York and only 70 miles north of Greece.”21 Describing the
location in this way made it important to Americans of Italian and Greek descent, of
which there are many, but also put in perspective how close Kosovo was to the Europe
that most Americans believed they knew. Kosovo was not some out-lying province in a
remote country. It was as close to Italy as Washington, D.C. was to New York City.
President Clinton’s geography references brought the conflict home to Americans.
Second, diplomacy had been attempted and had failed. President Clinton
referenced a peace agreement that Kosovar leaders had signed the previous month,
even though it did not give them all they wanted. Clinton contrasted the actions of the
Serbs: “The Serbian leaders, on the other hand, refused even to discuss key elements
of the peace agreement. As the Kosovars were saying yes to peace, Serbia stationed
40,000 troops in and around Kosovo in preparation for a major offensive—and in clear
violation of the commitments they had made.”22 This was but the latest example of
Serbian leaders, particularly Slobodan Milosevic, choosing war instead of peace.
Clinton counted on Americans to see the Serbian aggression as unjust and hoped
Americans realized that the bombings and use of force were a policy of last resort.
Third, as he had done in his discussion of American military involvement in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, President Clinton described in graphic detail some of the
horrors that the people of Kosovo had faced and were continuing to face.
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Now they've started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and
torching their houses. We've seen innocent people taken from their
homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men
dragged from their families, fathers and sons together, lined up and shot in
cold blood. This is not war in the traditional sense. It is an attack by tanks
and artillery on a largely defenseless people whose leaders already have
agreed to peace. 23
History again played a role. Though President Clinton did not specifically invoke the
memory of the Nazi blitzkrieg of World War II, the imagery was present in his words.
Americans may or may not have known about specific massacres that occurred during
World War II, but they knew that Hitler and the Nazis had massacred hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of innocent people. Clinton had acted to avoid a massacre of
a minority ethnic population by Slobodan Milosevic and the nationalistic Serbians.
President Clinton summarized his emotional appeal to the American population
by calling it a “moral imperative” that the American military become involved.24 Recall
his reference to the Pope above. Clinton argued that American participation in the
bombings of Serbian positions and paramilitary forces was the “right” thing to do.
However, Clinton also provided a more practical reason, a more logical reason, for
American military involvement in Kosovo, and that was that it was in America’s interest
to avoid the situation blossoming into a larger scale war.
Kosovo, Clinton explained, is a “small place,” but it “sits on a major fault line
between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and both the
Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity.”25 Here, President Clinton used
imagery associated with instability and the potential for an earthquake. He continued
using imagery of a fire starting,
And all around Kosovo there are other small countries struggling with their
own economic and political challenges, countries that could be
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overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo. All the
ingredients for a major war are there: ancient grievances, struggling
democracies, and in the center of it all a dictator in Serbia who has done
nothing since the cold war ended but start new wars and pour gasoline on
the flames of ethnic and religious division.26
Not only were “all the ingredients” for a major war present, but there was a “dictator”
ready to provide the spark. This was a clear reference to Hitler and his role in starting
World War II, and an emotional element combined with a logical argument. And, just to
make sure the American people understood the reference, President Clinton explained,
“Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where World War I began. World War II
and the Holocaust engulfed this region.”27
President Clinton invoked the two world wars, in part, because the use of force
by the United States had ultimately proved necessary and was perceived as
“successful.” In addition, the Kosovo bombings occurred only seven years after the Gulf
War and only three years after the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. United States
military involvement in both of those cases had proven to be “successful” as well. There
was no mention of Vietnam by Clinton, one, because he did not feel the need to
“exorcise that demon” as President Bush had, and, two, because, having been
perceived as a draft dodger, President Clinton could not afford politically to invoke any
lessons learned there.
President Clinton, however, did not want lessons of the two World Wars and
Bosnia and Herzegovina to go unlearned, so he focused on those. He noted how slow
Europe was to recognize the dangers and how slow the United States was to enter the
two world wars. Clinton exclaimed in his March 24, 1999, address, “Just imagine if
leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been
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saved, how many Americans would not have had to die.”28 Appeasement did not work
then and would not work now. Likewise, Clinton claimed, we learned some of the same
lessons in Bosnia and Herzegovina just a few years ago. He tied the lessons of World
War II and Bosnia and Herzegoviana together, describing the latter, “This was genocide
in the heart of Europe, not in 1945 but in 1995; not in some grainy newsreel from our
parents' and grandparents' time but in our own time, testing our humanity and our
resolve.”29 By using the word, “genocide,” President Clinton is appealing to the
American memory of the Nazi blitzkrieg and the Holocaust. Clinton argued that by
getting involved early enough in Kosovo in 1999, a greater war could be avoided and
not only would “innocent” lives be saved in Kosovo, but American lives would be spare
as well.
Following the cessation of the bombings less than three full months later,
President Clinton, in his June 10, 1999, speech, the victory lap speech with which this
section began, reiterated the same two themes. First, Clinton stated, the “firmness” of
the American people and the involvement and participation of the American military in
the Kosovo bombings “finally brought an end to a vicious campaign of ethnic
cleansing.”30 Second, Clinton claimed, “. . . we have averted the wider war this might
well have caused.”31 Here, again, was an emotional appeal and a logical appeal in
President Clinton’s rhetoric. The emotional appeal was for United States military
involvement in Kosovo based on humanitarian reasons. The logical, more practical
appeal was for United States military involvement in Kosovo in order to avert a greater
conflict in the region. We will turn next to consider how these themes were received by
Congress and the American public.
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D: Congressional and Public Response
i.

Congressional Debate

President Clinton’s personal character was at issue at the time he decided to
involve the United States military in the bombings of Kosovo in March of 1999.
However, Clinton and the White House were very adept at distinguishing the President’s
personal character from the character of the presidency. Thus, the Congressional
debate about American participation first in Bosnia and Herzegovina and later in the
Kosovo air-strikes was focused more on the issue than on the President, which was of
course what Clinton wanted. President Clinton did not have the experience in
international affairs that President George H.W. Bush brought to the office, nor did
Clinton did not have the experience in Washington, D.C., that Bush had before he was
elected President. Clinton had more international experience by 1999, but he was also
fighting other battles at that time. President Clinton’s personal life, described above,
was in the national spotlight in 1998 and 1999, when the crisis in Kosovo occurred.
Nevertheless, Clinton remained a popular President with the public, and somehow
overcame a Republican Congress to advocate for, and then defend, his decision to
involve the United States military in the Kosovo bombings.
President Clinton was elected President in November of 1992. By that time,
Yugoslavia had fallen apart, and many parts of the former Yugoslavia were exhibiting
strong nationalistic tendencies, including Serbia. Clinton received only 43% of the
popular vote. The House of Representatives was controlled by the Democrats..
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Nevertheless, Republican representatives picked up nine seats. The Senate balance
remained unchanged with the Democrats holding a 57 to 43 edge.
In the November1994 national elections, sometimes referred to as the
“Republican Revolution,” Republicans picked up 54 seats in the House of
Representatives to take a majority. Republicans also picked up eight seats in the
Senate to command a 52 to 48 advantage. This advantage in the Senate was further
increased when Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama and Senator Ben Nighthorse
Campbell of Colorado switched parties, giving Republicans two additional seats.
By 1994, President Clinton was already pushing for increased United States
military involvement in the Bosnia and Herzegovina crisis with his “lift and strike” policy.
However, this probably did not factor too much into the 1994 election results because
most observers agreed that the election results were a backlash against President
Clinton’s first two years in office and his domestic policy failures.32 For instance, much
of the Senate’s time leading into the election had been taken up by debate of President
Clinton’s ultimately unsuccessful national health care plan. Meanwhile, in the House of
Representatives, Newt Gingrich of Georgia led the charge for the “Contract with
America” program of domestic reforms proposed by the Republicans.33 Thus, Congress
in 1994 was not focusing on international affairs while President Clinton contemplated
the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Nevertheless, in 1994 President Clinton advocated for his “lift and strike” policy,
meaning lift the arms embargo then in place so that the United States, and others, could
arm the Muslims and Croats so that they could better resist the Serbs, and, in addition,
launch airstrikes against the Serbs to halt their advances against the Muslims and
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Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina
became better known to the American public during the summer of 1995, the
Republican led House and Senate took notice. Proposed legislation passed in both the
House and Senate calling for the United States to lift its embargo against supplying
arms to the Muslim and Croat forces and to begin bombing the Serbian positions.
However, President Clinton very much wanted the lift and strike policy to be accepted
by the world community, and, in particular United States allies in the United Nations and
in NATO. Clinton’s preference resulted in an early August 1995 veto of the lift and
strike legislation passed by the House and Senate.34 Clinton could not go along with
the unilateral approach. He felt he needed at least some international support.
Many European nations had contributed troops to peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia
and Herzegovina organized by the United Nations on humanitarian grounds. Some of
these European troops had been in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1992. Thus, many
European nations felt that NATO bombings of Serbian troops and positions would not
only not be humanitarian, but would also put their troops on the ground in danger of
reprisal from the Serbs. President Clinton believed strongly, though, that something
new had to be attempted. More than 7,000 people had been slaughtered by Serbs in
July of 1995. In the end, President Clinton had United States Ambassador to the United
Nations Madeline Albright and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake lobby strongly
with American allies in Europe, threatening that the United States was ready to go
forward alone with bombings of the Serb positions in Bosnia and Herzegovina with or
without allied support. Ultimately, though the United Nations did not condone or
authorize the actions, it backed down and sat by while NATO authorized and undertook
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the bombings for “humanitarian” reasons.35 Cease fire followed, and the Dayton
Accords, effectively ending the war, were reached in November of 1995.
When the Kosovo crisis flared up in 1998 and 1999, many felt that the lessons of
Bosnia should have applied much earlier. Early intervention by the international
community should have occurred. Many of Clinton’s critics later argued that the United
States should have taken a strong leadership role internationally, and backed up its role
with the threat of force much sooner than it did. However, as the crisis unfolded,
diplomatic options were attempted first. When those failed, President Clinton vowed to
move forward with a military option. By early 1999, the United States Congress was
ready to do something, but the same issue of whether Congressional authorization was
necessary that had confronted George H.W. Bush in 1991 during the Gulf War, was
again front and center. In addition, President Clinton was battling impeachment
proceedings domestically.
Congress in 1999 was controlled by the Republicans. The Republicans had a
223 to 211 majority in the House of Representatives and a 55 to 45 majority in the
Senate.36 President Clinton was reeling domestically in the wake of the Monica
Lewinsky scandal and in the middle of impeachment proceedings in 1999.
Nevertheless, Clinton was able to make the case for United States military involvement
in Kosovo. The debates were messy and unfocused. Those in support of United States
involvement had to overcome repeated references to and side-line debates concerning
Clinton’s actions with Monica Lewinsky and the impeachment process. Consensus was
hard to come by. Nevertheless, Congress appeared to support Clinton or, at least did
not oppose Clinton. Many Republicans, while distrustful of Clinton, implicitly agreed that
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something had to be done by remaining largely silent on the issue.37 At a minimum
Congress appeared to want to avoid another Bosnia and Herzegovina.
A more concrete vote of at least some Congressional approval came with the
Senate introduction and passage of a resolution on March 23, 1999, with bipartisan
support, “authorizing the President of the United States to conduct military air
operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro).”38 The resolution passed with a 58-31 vote in the Senate, but, later failed
to pass the House of Representatives in a April 28, 1999, vote.
The House vote, though, was rather after the fact though, literally as well as
figuratively, because President Clinton had authorized the United States to participate
with NATO in bombings to start on March 24, one day after the Senate passed its
resolution. The House vote did not condemn President Clinton for not waiting, which
was really its only option a month after the bombings had started. Instead, the vote
seemed more a way for the House to catch up publicly, or perhaps to seem more
relevant, to events already occurring.

ii.

Public Response

President Clinton remained an incredibly resilient and relatively popular president
throughout his time in office. Public reaction to the United States military involvement in
Bosnia and Herzegovina during the summer and fall of 1995 was underwhelming at
best. In fairness, the Oklahoma City bombing had occurred in April of 1995, so perhaps
American focus and concerns were more turned domestically rather than toward an
international crisis happening in a place about which they knew little.
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At the time of the Bosnia and Herzegovina bombings in July and August 1995,
President Clinton’s public approval rating hovered around 44%-46%.39 That popularity,
or lack thereof, however, was primarily connected to his domestic performance and had
little impact on how most Americans felt about Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though
distracted by domestic issues and the horrific Oklahoma City bombing, Americans were
not completely oblivious to what was happening in Eastern Europe. Americans were
aware of the genocide occurring and felt that something had to be done. For instance,
a Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll conducted by the University of
Maryland in 1994 found that 76% of Americans agreed that an ultimatum should be
given to Milosevic to withdraw the heavy artillery from Sarajevo that had been pounding
Muslims and Croats, and 80% of Americans agreed that if Milosevic did not abide, then
airstrikes were appropriate.40 Another PIPA poll in 1994 found that Americans were
concerned about genocide in general. When citizens were asked, “If genocidal
situations occur, do you think that the U.N., including the U.S., should intervene with
whatever force is necessary to stop the acts of genocide?” 65% said “always” or “in
most cases.” Only 23% answered “only when American interests are also involved,”
and only 6% said “never.”41
These two polls show the importance to Americans of avoiding the genocide
largely associated historically with the Second World War and more recently with
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the willingness of most Americans to respond with force if
necessary. The issue, for most Americans, was avoiding getting caught in a Vietnamlike situation, where troops were sent in without clear objectives or authority to fight. For
instance, 58% of respondents in a poll conducted May 23-24, 1999, “disapproved” of
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American ground troops being used in Kosovo in a “combat situation.”42 President
George H.W. Bush had avoided a Vietnam situation with the Gulf War; President
Clinton knew that he had to do the same with Bosnia and Herzegovina in the fall of
1995, and with Kosovo in March of 1999. Ultimately, President Clinton was able to do
just that. No American ground troops were used in Bosnia and Herzegovina until after
the bombings and resulting cease fire and peace treaty. No American ground troops
were used in Kosovo until after the bombing, and then only in conjunction with United
Nations peace-keeping efforts.
President Clinton faced incredible obstacles domestically in early 1999 in the
aftermath of the Monica Lewinsky scandal and the impeachment hearings.
Nevertheless, in early March of 1999, Clinton’s public approval rating was a very robust
68%.43 It was still a strong 60% in early April of 1999, just a week or two after the
Kosovo bombings.44 Again, these polls likely reflect Americans’ views on President
Clinton’s domestic agenda and troubles rather than his decisions regarding Kosovo, but
not all American attention was focused inward.
At least some attention was focused on Kosovo. A CNN/USA Today poll
published on April 1, 1999, about a week after the NATO bombings of Kosovo started,
showed that a majority believed that the NATO airstrikes would eventually make things
better in Kosovo once the bombings concluded, and that two-thirds of respondents
believed that Clinton could handle the situation in Kosovo.45 A later CNN/USA Today
poll published on June 7, 1999, about a week after the NATO bombings of Kosovo were
suspended, showed that most Americans favored the Kosovo peace agreement that
was reached, that most Americans viewed the situation in Kosovo as a “clear victory” for
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the United States and Kosovo, and that Clinton was a “winner” as a result of the military
action in Kosovo.46
Whether or not Clinton was a winner, it was clear that he had successfully
understood and appealed to the emotions of Americans in order to gain support for a
military response in Kosovo. The public reaction to President Clinton’s decision to
involve the United States military in the NATO bombings of Kosovo was a testament to
Clinton’s ability to invoke history and specifically appeal to the emotions of Americans
with his themes of “humanitarianism” and “avoidance of another world war” in his
Kosovo rhetoric. Public reaction was also a testament to Clinton’s political resilience.
Resiliency also describes President Clinton’s successor in the White House,
George W. Bush. The second President Bush narrowly won election to the Presidency
and then had to lead the United States in a new war and then expanding war on terror
in the aftermath of the Al-Qaeda led terrorist attacks against the United States on
September 11, 2001.
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Chapter III: Post 9/11: Defining Terrorism as War and Beginning the War on Terror
during George W. Bush’s First Term in Office

On September 11, 2001, less than one year into the presidency of George W.
Bush, members of an Islamic terrorist group, Al-Qaeda, hijacked four civilian airplanes,
flying two of the planes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City
and one plane into one side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just across the
Potomac River from Washington, D.C. The alleged plan for the fourth plane was for it to
fly into Washington D.C., probably into the White House, but the plan was foiled by
passengers on board who had heard what had happened at the World Trade Center
and who then rushed against the terrorists, forcing the plane down. The plane
ultimately crashed in Pennsylvania, killing all aboard.
The events of this day changed the way Americans thought about their security.
Americans had been victims of domestic terrorism before, such as in Oklahoma City,
and Americans had been victims of terrorism abroad before. This, however, was an
attack by foreign group against Americans on American soil. This “new” kind of
terrorism, later defined by President George W. Bush as an “act of war,”1 had been
brought by international forces into the United States. Terrorism was no longer
something that happened “over there.” In response to this act of war, President Bush
advocated in his rhetoric a response of equal measure. According to President Bush,
Americans needed to prepare for war and begin war, a new kind of war, a war on
terrorism.

72

This chapter considers President Bush’s definition of the war on terror in the
aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, Bush’s preferred response, and explores how this
definition and response led to the United States beginning military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Three important addresses are highlighted. First, President Bush
defined the “new” threat of terrorism and outlined America’s role in the “war on
terrorism” in his address to the nation presented on September 20, 2001, only nine days
after 9/11. In many ways, this speech was the foundation for all later decisions by
President Bush with regard to conduct and expansion of the war on terror. Second, less
than three weeks later, on October 7, 2001, Bush announced the commencement of
United States and British military action in Afghanistan, later called “Operation Enduring
Freedom,” not only as a response to 9/11, but as a necessary step in the broader war
on terror. Though this October 7, 2001, address was short, it was an important piece of
rhetoric that put the feelings, ideas and warnings of President Bush’s September 20
address into action. Third, on March 17, 2003, President Bush expanded the war on
terror even further, warning Saddam Hussein that an attack on his country was
imminent. This attack, later known as “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” began on March 19,
2003.
The above noted events and accompanying presidential rhetoric all occurred
during President Bush’s first term in office, and this thesis focuses on Bush’s first term
in office because it was during this time, in the more immediate aftermath of 9/11, that
Bush used rhetoric to both call Americans to war and to establish the parameters of the
war on terror. While the definition of the war on terror and the scope of American
involvement in the war on terror continued to evolve with George W. Bush’s second
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term, and has continued to evolve during President Barack Obama’s terms as
President, the broader war on terror, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, began as a
response to 9/11.
As with earlier chapters, George W. Bush’s rhetoric is considered within the
analysis of rhetoric initially proposed by Aristotle and expounded upon by Zarefsky and
others. In considering how persuasive his rhetoric was, we will consider the character
of George W. Bush, his use of logic and, most importantly, his ability to identify and
appeal to the emotions of his audience. In doing this analysis, as in previous chapters,
we examine the President’s background and the domestic context of the rhetoric, the
rhetoric itself, and the public and congressional responses to the rhetoric.

A: The Situation: The 2000 Presidential Election and Bush’s Character
Much has been written about the 2000 election.2 Because President Bush won
so narrowly, the election itself was an important political event that shaped the early
days of the Bush Presidency. To summarize, George W. Bush, then Governor of Texas,
was elected, winning the electoral vote, yet losing the popular vote to then VicePresident Al Gore by over 500,000 votes. The public and electoral votes were disputed.
The Florida Supreme Court and ultimately the United States Supreme Court both heard
challenges. The end result was that no recount was needed and the Bush victory was
confirmed. Conflicting views remain today about whether Bush would have won the
election had the recount, using certain disputed criteria, been allowed to proceed. It
was an inauspicious, if not tainted, beginning for Bush and the Bush presidency.
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Bush’s character coming into the presidency contrasted with both his father,
George H.W. Bush, and his predecessor, William Clinton. Although George W. Bush
came in with his father’s name and accompanying significant familial name recognition,
he did not come into office with the gravitas or experience or personal character his
father had been able to demonstrate. The Bush name was certainly helpful to George
W. Bush during the election, but once he was elected, Bush had to make his own way,
but live up to his father’s reputation – a reputation that had improved over time.3
More important than any credibility the Bush name may have lent was the fact
that George W. Bush did not have the experience upon which his father had been able
to draw. George W. Bush had served as Governor of Texas, but did not have a long list
of Washington, D.C., contacts. He also did not have the extensive foreign intelligence
and foreign policy experience that his father had had as Director of Central Intelligence,
Envoy to China and Vice-President. Like Clinton, the younger Bush also did not have a
particularly distinguished military career. Bush had served in the Texas Air National
Guard, but how long he had served and what his duties had been and whether he had
completed his service were all issues of controversy. In addition, Bush had earned a bit
of a playboy image as a younger adult, with allegations of excessive partying and
drinking.4 However, while Bush was able to avoid the attacks on his personal character
that Clinton had had to endure, or at least avoid the consequences, Bush came into the
presidency like Clinton had before him. Both Clinton and Bush had executive
experience at the state level, but both needed to learn Washington practices and foreign
policy on the job and earn the trust of a significant portion of voters.
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B: The Situation: The United States Congress in 2001
The Republican Party controlled the House of Representatives by a slim 222 –
211 seat margin prior to the November 2000 federal election. Following the election,
Republicans still held a majority, but it was even slimmer at 221-212 seats. In the
Senate, the Republican Party lost seats in the 2000 election, with the end result being
that Democrats and Republicans each held 50 seats in the Senate. George W. Bush,
therefore, had to tread carefully when outlining his vision of the presidency and
advocating his policy initiatives.
Bush did exactly that. During his first 100 days in office, he interacted only
minimally with Congress, traveled the country reaching out to voters, and pointedly
refused to support further congressional inquiries into the Clinton presidency and
decisions that had been made prior to Bush’s inauguration.5 Bush Chief of Staff
Andrew Card noted that the White House would “continue to defend the authority of the
president - - no matter who he is,” even if Congress chose to further investigate
Clinton.6 This separation from the Clinton Presidency allowed Bush to begin to create
his own White House.
Bush also had to separate his presidency from his father’s presidency. Bush
therefore used the same theme, the authority of the office of the president, throughout
his presidency. Bush’s reliance on the office of the president rather than his own
character often allowed Bush to deflect criticism that he was merely the “young George
Bush” or just the “son of George H.W. Bush,” and allowed him to create his own
Presidential agenda.
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The United States Congress, though very evenly split during these early days of
the Bush presidency, moved on from the hard feelings of the Clinton presidency.
President Bush’s quiet approach and self-deprecating sense of humor seemed to have
a calming effect on the country.7 Though there was some Congressional bickering over
budget proposals, Bush was also blessed with a relatively stable economy and few
divisive domestic issues to immediately tackle.8
During his first 100 days in office and, in fact, during the first eight months of his
presidency leading up to 9/11, George W. Bush proved to be quite popular with the
American public. His approval ratings never dipped below 50%. Gallup Poll
presidential job approval ratings for Bush were has high as 63% in early March of 2001
and 62% in mid-April of 2001.9 These ratings were not only strong, but were even
higher than approval ratings had been for George H.W. Bush and William Clinton at
similar times in their presidencies.10 The honeymoon period began to wane over the
summer months of 2001, as Congress took up debate over domestic economic issues,
with Bush’s approval rating dropping at one point to 52% at the end of June.11
Nevertheless, the approval rating rose back up to 57% twice during the summer before
coming down to 51% in early September, just before 9/11.12
There has been some discussion that Bush “became popular” as a result of his
response to 9/11. However, he was a relatively popular President prior to 9/11, so
perhaps a better way to describe his popularity is that it increased - - dramatically for a
while - - as a result of 9/11. More importantly, though, Bush signaled early on by
allowing the controversies and hard feelings left over from the Clinton presidency to die
down, and poking fun at himself13, and reaching out to voters who he knew probably
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had not voted for him, that he thought the office of the President was more important
than the individual. Thus, in contrast to his father, and in similar style to President
Clinton, in his Presidency and his rhetoric, Bush attempted to draw upon the character
of the office of the Presidency rather than his own person.
In looking at President Bush within Aristotle’s model, the “character of the
speaker,” therefore, was the office of the President, and not necessarily Bush, himself.
This distinction was by design due to Bush’s desire to distance himself from his father’s
presidency, Clinton’s presidency and his own lack of national and international
experience. However, as Bush’s presidency continued, the public, specifically members
of Congress and the American people, began to judge Bush increasingly on his
experience and decision-making as President. The attacks of 9/11 and the initiation of
the war on terror occurred very early in the Bush presidency, so for the purposes of this
paper, we will focus on a time-period when Bush could rely on the power of the office of
the President.

C: The Rhetoric
The attacks against the United States on 9/11, which occurred in the United
States, changed the way most Americans viewed their own security and the security of
the United States. Emotions, such as anger, fear, and revenge, ran strong. 14 President
George W. Bush, appealed to those emotions in his rhetoric, defining the attacks as an
act of “war,” and advocating a war-like response, especially in what was perhaps his
seminal address on September 20, 2001, discussing the attacks of 9/11 and defining
what became to be known as the “war on terror.” The speech was not only an attempt
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to discuss and define the events of 9/11, but also an outline for an American response,
not just to 9/11, but to the “forces of terror” that could attack in the future.
Less than three weeks later, on October 7, 2001, Bush formally announced the
beginning of United States military action, taken in conjunction with Great Britain, in
Afghanistan. The speech itself is rather brief, more of an announcement than a
persuasive statement of position. However, the address was important as President
Bush carefully fit not only this decision into the outline of the war on terror that he had
set forth in the September 20, 2001, address, but brought the ideas and warnings
expressed in the September 20th address to life by taking action.15
George W. Bush advocated for, and then announced, a significant further
expansion of the war on terror in the form of United States military action in Iraq in
March of 2003. Iraq represented not only a new front for the war on terror, but a new
war. During a dramatic public message to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein on March 17,
2003, and a subsequent announcement to the American people that military action in
Iraq had commenced on March 19, 2003, Bush let Americans and the world know that
the war on terrorism had become broader and more complex.
These addresses set out the definition, the initiation and the expansion of the war
on terror. The September 20, 2001, address immediately following the attacks of 9/11,
defined the war on terror and set the parameters for the response to 9/11 and the
initiation of the war on terror. The announcement of United States military action in
Afghanistan formally initiated the war on terror. The announcement of United States
military action against and within Iraq expanded the war on terror.
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i.

Address to the Nation on September 20, 2001

President Bush emphasized several themes during the September 20, 2001,
address, setting his vision out as a series of answers to questions and concerns he
thought Americans (and leaders of other countries around the world) had about the 9/11
attacks and the American response. He asserted to Americans and the world that
America was strong and united. He defined the 9/11 attacks as an act of “war.”16 He
described the enemy and took pains to explain how members of the enemy were
different than Americans. He outlined how America would fight the war. He
emphasized that America would not be fighting alone. He explained why America
would win the war.
Bush began the address by providing examples of how strong and how united
Americans were during and after the 9/11 attacks. He claimed he did not have to report
on the state of the Union because the report had “already been delivered by the
American people.”17 Bush emphasized the strength and decency of the American
people: “We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save
others on the ground. . .We have seen (it) in the endurance of rescuers, working past
exhaustion. . .We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of
blood, the saying of prayers. . .We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people,
who have made the grief of strangers their own.”18
These statements were meant to show that Americans were brave, relentless,
patriotic, hopeful, and willing to make sacrifices for each other. These were the traits of
Americans that President Bush was not only signaling to the rest of the world, but also
clearly hoping would continue to be prevalent among Americans as the war on terror
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began. Bush was not simply addressing the American public, though, but members of
Congress, too. He continued his theme of a unified and strong America by noting that
Congress, Democrats and Republicans, had gathered together on the Capitol steps to
sing, “God Bless America.”19 He also thanked Congress for its swift authorization of
funds to assist with a response.20 In a few short sentences, Bush demonstrated to
Congress, and the world, how strong and unified the American public was, and
demonstrated to the American public, and the world, how strong and unified Congress
was. It was a simple approach, but effective.
President Bush also made clear that America did not stand alone. He noted that
he would “. . . never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at Buckingham
Palace, and on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate.”21 He noted
South Korean children who prayed outside the American embassy in Seoul, the prayers
of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo, the moments of silence and days of
mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America.22 Bush also remembered foreign
nationals who had died in the attacks, from Pakistan, India, El Salvador, Iran, Mexico,
Japan and Great Britain, and he noted that British Prime Minister Tony Blair had flown
across the Atlantic to be present at this address.23 By noting countries all over the
world, Bush was not only bringing in allies as fellow victims of the 9/11 attacks to show
unity of purpose in a response, but setting the stage for his vision of a broader definition
of the war on terror.
In what was probably the most critical statement of the address, President Bush
defined the 9/11 attacks as an act of war: “On September the eleventh, enemies of
freedom committed an act of war against our country.”24 Once he defined the attack as
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an act of war, Bush was able to use what Professor Zarefsky, cited above, called the
“war metaphor”25 to outline his discussion of the “enemy” and his vision of a war-like
response. Calling the attack an act of war implied, according to the war metaphor, that
the nation had to be unified, that agendas needed to be reprioritized, and that there had
to be a commitment and resolve to win.26 Bush was preparing the nation to go to war.
President Bush identified the enemy, but took care to clarify who was not the
enemy. The enemy was not a specific sovereign state, although Bush later linked the
terrorists to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The enemy was not the Muslim religion
or Muslims in general. In fact, Bush explained that the actions of the terrorism were
against the beliefs of the Muslim religion. The enemy was not Arabs. In fact, many
Arab states were planning to join with the United States in the war on terrorism.
Instead, Bush stated, “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every
government that supports them.”27 Already, Bush was differentiating the “war” on
terrorism from a more traditional war against a sovereign state or people.
Many Americans that night heard, for the first time, about Al-Qaeda and its
leader, Osama bin Laden. Bush described Al-Qaeda as a loosely organized group of
“fringe” Muslim terrorists, with a “directive” to kill Christians and Jews, including
Americans, without regard for civilian loss.28 He described Al-Qaeda terrorists as “heirs
of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century,” saying that they “follow in the
path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.”29
Like Clinton who characterized Milosevic and his Serbian followers as thugs in
advocating for the Kosovo air strikes, and like his father who had characterized Hussein
and the Iraqi army as Hitler-esque in advocating for the Gulf War, George W. Bush used

82

history, specifically imagery from World War II, to identify and characterize the enemy
after 9/11. It was imagery that was familiar to most Americans and, generally, not
controversial. There was little debate that “fascism” and “Nazism” and “totalitarianism”
were bad ideas. Most Americans believed that the United States had been “right” to
fight against ideas things in World War II. By equating terrorists with historical villains
such as Hitler and Milosevic, and by equating terrorism with fascism and Nazism and
totalitarianism, Bush hoped there would be strong support for fighting the war on
terrorism.
Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda leaders, Bush went on to say, had great
influence in Afghanistan and controlled the Taliban government. President Bush noted
that Americans had no grievance against the Afghan people, and were in fact the
greatest source of international humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. He condemned the
Taliban, though, and made very war-like demands on the Taliban government,
emphasizing that the demands were “not open to discussion.”30 Bush demanded that
the Taliban deliver to the United States all the leaders of Al-Qaeda; release all foreign
nationals unjustly imprisoned in Afghanistan; and protect foreign journalists, diplomats
and aid workers in Afghanistan; and permanently close all terrorist camps in
Afghanistan, handing over all terrorists to “appropriate authorities,” and granting the
United States “full access” to the camps to make sure they were no longer operating. 31
The demands were followed by a specific threat to the Taliban: the Taliban must
act and hand over the terrorists, “or they will share in their fate.”32 In addition, Bush
made clear to other nations that they had a choice to make. “Either you are with us, or
you are with the terrorists.”33 There was no “neutral” position in the war on terrorism,
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either domestically or internationally. Bush put the American people, members of
Congress and the world on notice that in the war on terrorism, “either you are with us or
against us.” This positioning laid the groundwork for later expansion of the war on terror.
Note the contrast with his father’s approach to the Gulf War in 1991. George
H.W. Bush felt strongly about acting against Saddam Hussein’s invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, but he could not take a position quite so aggressively. In 1991,
memories of the United States actions in Vietnam were still relatively fresh. In 1991,
George H.W. Bush reacted to events occurring in the Middle East. In 2001, George W.
Bush reacted to attacks that had occurred specifically against the United States within
the United States. George H.W. Bush, therefore, perhaps felt in 1991 that he had to act
within certain restrictions that George W. Bush maybe felt did not apply to him in 2001.
George H.W. Bush apparently felt he had to build a coalition, whereas his son could act
more independently. George H.W. Bush apparently felt he had to restrict the military
action to freeing Kuwait, whereas his son could plan for a broader action.
In his September 20, 2001, address, President Bush was not precise in his
description of how America would fight the war on terrorism. He broadly stated, “We will
direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every
necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and defeat of the global terror network.”34
This allowed President Bush some latitude, but also allowed him time to plan.
Remember, this address was delivered only a little over one week after 9/11, so plans
were still being finalized.

84

The war on terrorism also contained a new element of defense at home, and
accompanying increased security measures for all Americans. Bush announced the
creation of a Cabinet-level position to coordinate homeland security. Henceforth,
America would have a Director of Homeland Security and an Office of Homeland
Security.35 Americans, as discussed below, were also asked to compromise some of
their personal liberties in the name of security.
President Bush was also careful to distinguish this war on terrorism from other
more recent wars: “This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with its
decisive liberation of territory and its swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war
above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single
American was lost in combat.36 Instead, Bush said, Americans should prepare for a
“lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have seen.”37 Even though President Bush
used the Gulf War and the Kosovo air strikes as examples of necessary military action
by the United States, he also took care to differentiate this new war. And by
differentiating the war, Bush prepared Americans for the idea that success or victory
might have a different, perhaps not so easy, definition as well.
Bush closed this September 20, 2001, address by characterizing the war on
terrorism as a fight for freedom. Asking Americans to fight for freedom, a concept
Americans had fought for before, beginning with the American Revolution, Bush stated,
“The advance of freedom – the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of
every time – now depends on us.”38 And though Bush acknowledged that the “course of
the conflict” could not be known, he reassured Americans that, “we will meet violence
with patient justice – assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the
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victories to come.”39 In addition, President Bush, as President Clinton and as President
George H.W. Bush had done before him, invoked power of religious right and might.
George W. Bush, though, could be far more explicit with his references to religious
righteousness and his personal beliefs, given the raw emotions of Americans following
9/11. God was on America’s side, according to Bush: “Freedom and fear, justice and
cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.”40
Thus, as of September 20, 2001, President Bush in his rhetoric had defined the
9/11 attacks as an act of war, had defined the enemy, had demonstrated the unity of the
American people and of the Congress, and had made specific demands of Afghanistan
and the Taliban. America was ready to go to war.

ii.

Initiating the War on Terrorism: Military Action in Afghanistan

President Bush announced that American airstrikes in Afghanistan against
terrorist camps and Taliban military targets had started only about two-and-a-half weeks
later, during a relatively brief and business-like October 7, 2001, address from the White
House. The emotions of the American public and members of Congress were still
running very high, and Bush spoke to these emotions. Symbolically, President Bush
spoke from the Treaty Room of the White house, a place where he said American
presidents had “worked for peace.”41 Yet, there was nothing peaceful about the
announcement. Instead the speech was more of a demonstration and warning, to both
the world and to the American people that the war had begun. Bush stated clearly that
more than two weeks ago he had given the Taliban leaders a set of demands – in the
September 20, 2001, address discussed above – and, “None of these demands were
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met. And now, the Taliban will pay a price.”42 The military action in Afghanistan became
known as “Operation Enduring Freedom,” again a reference to Bush’s characterization
of the war during his September 20, 2001, address as a war for freedom as much as a
war against terror.
As he did in his September 20, 2001, address, President Bush emphasized that
the military action would not be quick and that it was only part of the broader war on
terror. Bush used the speech to further warn and prepare Americans for a long military
campaign. He stated that while terrorists may go underground – literally – for a while,
“Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and
relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice.”43

Bush also used

the speech to remind Americans that, “This military action is a part of our campaign
against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined through
diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets and the arrests of known
terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 countries.”44
Finally, President Bush used the announcement of the beginning of military
action in Afghanistan as an opportunity to ask for “patience” from Americans, both for
the increased security measures at home and for the sacrifices made at home and by
those fighting abroad.45 Bush foresaw that this would not be a quick war. It would be a
rout like the Gulf War. It would not be conducted solely with air strikes, like the Kosovo
bombings. This speech, while echoing some of the same themes as the September 20,
2001, address, was not about symbolism or unity or pride as much as it was about a
clear statement to members of Congress and the American people that the war on
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terrorism had begun. America was doing what it could through various means, but the
fighting had begun and sacrifices would be required.

iii.

Expanding the War on Terrorism: Military Action in Iraq

Less than two years later, with fighting on-going in Afghanistan, in March of
2003, President Bush announced the invasion of Iraq by American and other allied
forces. The invasion of Iraq represented a further expansion of the war on terror, and
an expansion not directly related to the terrorist attacks against the United States of
9/11. While the memory of 9/11 was still vivid in the minds of most Americans,
emotions had tempered a bit. Much of the fighting in Afghanistan was “building to
building” in the towns and guerilla style attacks and counter-attacks in the rugged
mountains. Clear victories were few and far between. Osama bin Laden had escaped.
Members of the military died. Thus, in justifying and advocating for the invasion of Iraq,
Bush used a combination of logic and appeal to emotion. The emotions of the
American people and members of Congress were still important, but President Bush
had to link those emotions to a logical argument for attacking Iraq.
President Bush made his argument directly to the American people in a televised
address on March 17, 2003, entitled, “Message to Saddam.” Despite the title, the
address had multiple audiences. The address was delivered as a warning to Saddam
Hussein, specifically giving Saddam and his sons forty-eight hours to leave Iraq or else
military action would begin, but more importantly it set forth for Americans, members of
Congress and the world exactly why the United States was preparing to invade Iraq.
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Bush’s argument in the March 17, 2003, address was relatively simple.
According to Bush, there were three reasons the United States had to attack Iraq at that
point. First, Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Second, if left unchecked, Iraq
could and would link with its “terrorist allies” and attack the United States. Third, the
United States could bring democracy, or at least peace and order, to Iraq and the
Middle East.46 This was the logical argument, but Bush was careful to link each point
with emotions.
For instance, President Bush began the address by reminding Americans that
Iraq had pledged to destroy all weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending
the Persian Gulf War of 1991.47 By reminding Americans of the Persian Gulf War and
linking weapons of mass destruction to that war, Bush accomplished three objectives.
First, the clear implication was that this threat of Iraq using weapons of mass
destruction was not a new threat. Second, by linking the threat to a war that had
occurred twelve years earlier, Bush implied that the threat posed by Iraq in 2003 was a
continuation of the threat it had posed in 1991 and Iraq “had it coming.” Third, and
perhaps most importantly, by linking weapons of mass destruction to the Gulf War,
Bush evoked feelings of a “successful” war against Iraq. The Gulf War, discussed
earlier, had been quick, decisive and accomplished with very few American casualties,
though some certainly felt that there was unfinished business. By trusting Americans to
feel good, or at least justified, about involvement in the earlier Gulf War, Bush hoped
that Americans would support this new war against Iraq.
President Bush also linked Iraq to Al-Qaeda, bringing up the much fresher
emotions caused by 9/11. He called Iraq a “regime” with a “history of reckless
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aggression” and a “deep hatred of America and our friends.”48 He claimed that Iraq had
“aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of Al-Qaeda.”49 He laid out
the danger to America: “The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day,
nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated
ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our
country. . .”50 The implication was that if the United States did not act now another 9/11
– or worse – could happen in the future.
President Bush also referred indirectly to World War II and the dangers
represented by Hitler. Again, this reference to a prior war, a war still considered by
most Americans as a “good” war, or at least “necessary” war, was an important appeal
to the emotions of the American people. Bush characterized Saddam as a “dictator,”51
indirectly comparing him to Hitler and warning that Saddam could commit “Hitler-like”
atrocities. Implying that Saddam was an “aggressive dictator,” Bush stated, “One
reason the U.N. was founded after the Second World War was to confront aggressive
dictators, actively and early, before they can attack the innocent and destroy the
peace.”52
Bush continued his reference to the Second World War by later referring to
“appeasement” and reminded Americans why that strategy would not work, stating,
In the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, whose
threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war. In this century,
when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of
appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this
earth.”53
Bush clearly wanted Americans to apply lessons of the 20th century to the 21st century,
and warned what could happen if the United States failed to act meaningfully.

90

President Bush ended this “Message to Saddam” address by appealing to ideals
that he felt most Americans valued most: liberty, freedom and democracy. He stated,
that, “As we enforce the just demands of the world, we will also honor the deepest
commitments of our country. . .The United States, with other countries, will work to
advance liberty and peace in that region.”54 He continued, stating that when “the
dictator,” referring to Saddam, had departed, Iraq could “set an example to all the
Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.”55 Two days later, on
March 19, 2003, as promised by Bush, the United States and coalition forces attacked
Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom began.
Thus, President Bush made a relatively simple argument, appealing to logic, to
support his decision to invade Iraq. Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had
links to Al-Qaeda. Iraq, on its own, or with its “terrorist allies” could use those weapons
against the United States unless checked now. The attack against Iraq would ultimately
result in more stability and peace in Iraq and the region. However, each of these pieces
of the argument was linked to appeals to emotions still strongly felt about terrorism.
And, while there was debate and some controversy about whether there really were
weapons of mass destruction and whether what was in effect a pre-emptive strike was
necessary, initially, most of the American public and members of Congress supported
not only the war on terror in Afghanistan, but also the expansion of the war on terror in
Iraq.
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D Congressional and Public Response
i.

Congressional Action

Congress was quick to react to the attacks of 9/11 and continued to react during
President Bush’s first term in office. Recall that Republicans held a very narrow eleven
seat advantage in the House in September of 2001, and Republicans and Democrats
were evenly split in the Senate. Nevertheless, the incredible impact of the 9/11 attacks
on America and the American way of life jolted Congress into bipartisan action. Nearly
fifty pieces of legislation were passed by the House and Senate just in reaction to 9/11,
with nearly one-hundred additional pieces of legislation considered.56 President Bush
asked Congress for authorization to use military force in response to the attacks and got
it in the form of Senate Joint Resolution 23. There were also a series of laws enacted
with the goal of providing greater security to Americans, most importantly the “USA
Patriot Act of 2001.” These pieces of legislation changed the way Americans lived and
continue to affect American life today.
On September 12, 2001, one day after 9/11, President Bush proposed legislation
to the Senate allowing for the use of military force in response to 9/11. The House and
Senate jointly passed Senate Joint Resolution 23 with some modifications, and
President Bush signed the legislation into law on September 14, 2001. Though Bush
got what he wanted, almost word for word in the section authorizing military force,
Congress did add an important section discussing the requirements of the 1973 War
Powers Resolution, commonly referred to as the War Powers Act, which had not even
been mentioned in the White House draft legislation. Congress acted very quickly,
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therefore, but was careful to acknowledge and confirm its authority under the War
Power Act.57
The final text of what became known as the “Authorization for Use of Military
Force” included broad language authorizing the President to,
. . . use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.58
Thus, President Bush had authority to use military force against organizations
and individuals, as well as against nations, and the ability to use that military
force not only as a response against those who may have participated or aided in
the 9/11 attacks, but as a preventative measure in an attempt to prevent future
acts of terrorism against the United States. This language reflected the very
broad view of the war on terrorism that Bush set forth less than a week later in
his September 20, 2001, address to the Joint Congress and the nation,
discussed above.
Nevertheless, Congress added language in the final version of Joint
Resolution 23 specifically entitled, “War Powers Resolution Requirements,”
reserving to Congress the authority to “declare war.” Under Section (b)(1) of the
legislation, entitled, “Specific Statutory Authorization,” Congress declared that the
section was “intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of section 5(b) pf the War Powers Resolution.”59 Additionally, Congress
stated that, “nothing in this resolution (Joint Resolution 23) supercedes (sic) any
requirement of the War Powers Resolution.”60
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President Bush did not quibble with the constraints, real or implied, placed
by Congress in the second section of Joint Resolution 23, but instead relied on
the broad language of the first section to expand the war on terrorism by first
beginning military operations in Afghanistan in October of 2001, less than one
month after 9/11, and by later attacking Iraq, in March of 2003. However, the
timing of the beginning of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is important.
Whereas Bush felt he did not need any further authorization when he ordered the
military into Afghanistan so soon after 9/11, the beginning of military operations
in Iraq was a broader expansion of the “war on terror,” and took a longer time
and additional interaction with Congress before occurring.
Bush started moving the United States toward war with Iraq in the fall of
2002. Bush presented an address in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002, in which he
set forth the “threat” that Iraq posed to the United States in the same way in
which he would present it five months later in his message to Saddam.
According to Bush, Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and Iraq had links to
terrorists, specifically Al-Qaeda.61 The October 7, 2002, speech in Cincinnati
was in a way a platform for President Bush to lobby Congress one last time
before it voted on authorizing military action in Iraq, because Bush had made the
formal request to Congress and the issue was up for vote later that same week.
On October 11, 2002, four days later, Congress passed House Joint
Resolution 114, entitled, “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002.”62 The legislation began with references to working with and
through the United Nations Security Council to enforce resolutions “regarding
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Iraq,” but then went into broad language authorizing the President to use United
States armed forces to “(1) defend U.S. national security against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq.”63 There was additional language stating a requirement that
diplomatic means had to be attempted first, and further language that the
President was supposed to report to Congress every 60 days.64 And, as was the
case with Senate Joint Resolution 23, discussed above, Congress specifically
reserved the right to declare war by stating that the section was “intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization for the use of the armed forces,
consistent with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.”65
Even with Congress reserving the right to declare war, and even with the
constraints of having to attempt diplomacy first and having to report to Congress,
the legislation affirmed that Iraq posed a threat to the United States and provided
broad authority to the President to wage war on Iraq to counter that threat. And
while the President could choose to work with American allies and others on the
United Nations Security Council, the legislation did not make that mandatory.
This was a victory for Bush, who attempted to work closely with Great Britain and
other United States allies, but retained the flexibility for the United States to go it
alone if necessary.
Note that this lobbying effort by Bush and the passing of subsequent
legislation occurred in October of 2002, right before mid-term elections.
Members of Congress, especially those up for re-election, probably acutely felt
the pressure of Bush’s theme of: “either you are with us or against us” on the war
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on terrorism. Members of Congress did not want to be seen as being “against”
the war on terrorism. Clearly, this helped Bush push the legislation through.
While the initiation of the war on terrorism represented by the start of
military action in Afghanistan and the expansion of the war was reflected in the
legislation discussed above and the advent of military action in Iraq, there was
equally important Congressional action at home in the form of sweeping
legislation commonly known as the Patriot Act. The USA PATRIOT ACT, which
stands for, “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001,” is a 131-page piece of
legislation originating in the House that addressed a number of issues
domestically in an effort to make America more secure against terrorists.66 The
result, however, was a significant chilling effect on the civil liberties of Americans
and foreign nationals residing in the United States.
For instance, the Patriot Act grants the President broad authority to
confiscate property of “any foreign person, foreign organization or foreign
country,” subject to “the jurisdiction of the United States,” that the President
“determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or
attacks against the United States.”67 In short, the Act increased the jurisdiction of
the United States, allowing the President to seize the property of foreign
nationals or organizations if he could, and if he determined that those nationals
or organizations were in any way involved in terrorism.
The Patriot Act granted broad authority to the federal government to
“intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications relating to terrorism.”68 The
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Act, however, did not specifically describe how the federal government was to
determine whether communications “related to terrorism” before intercepting
them. The Act included a section relating to the movement of currency in and out
of the United States.69 The Act included stricter border controls, for Americans
and foreign nationals, as well as “enhanced” immigration provisions.70 The Act
broadened the criminal definition of terrorism.71 In short, the Patriot Act
attempted to address any facet of American life that could be related to terrorism.
Despite its very broad scope, the Patriot Act was quickly drafted and
quickly passed.72 It had been introduced as House Bill 3162 on October 23,
2001, just over a month after 9/11. The House voted to approve the legislation,
357-66, on October 24, 2001. The Senate confirmed, by a vote of 98-1, on
October 25, 2001. Though the scope of the Patriot Act was to spawn a number
of issues and questions and legal challenges later, at the time, in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, there was little debate about its necessity.
Interestingly, the Patriot Act was introduced, debated and ultimately
signed into law with little participation from President Bush or the White House,
except for the final signing. Rather, the Patriot Act was more of a Congressional
attempt to reflect the seriousness of the issues raised by the new war on terror
by addressing those issues that presented themselves at home, within the United
States. President Bush, of course, did not oppose the legislation as it gave
further credence to his position that this crisis demanded a broad response,
including the use of military action in Afghanistan and later in Iraq.
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i.

Public Response

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and President Bush’s strong response, both in
his rhetoric and his actions, resulted in a wave of patriotism and a strong sense
of national unity. In effect, Americans rallied around their president. Bush’s
approval rating on September 21-22, 2001, immediately after he outlined his
vision for the American response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the war on
terror, spiked to a 90% level, up from just over 50% immediately prior to the
attacks.73 This spike in approval rating perhaps cannot be completely attributed
to Bush’s address of September 20, 2001, but Bush’s strong rhetoric and
demonstration that the United States would respond and had a plan undoubtedly
played a role. Bush’s approval rating gradually declined as war on terror grew.
Americans began losing their lives in Afghanistan, and the realities of the Patriot
Act and a new way of life took its toll, but Bush’s approval rating was still an
extremely positive 84% at the beginning of 2002.74
Bush’s rhetoric during his first term, however, was effective in rallying the
country. When he announced that Iraq posed a threat to the United States on
October 7, 2002, and Congress passed House Joint Resolution 114, entitled,
“Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” four
days later, Bush’s approval rating was still above 60%.75 When he delivered his
“Message to Saddam” address on March 17, 2003, his approval rating went from
57% in early March to 71% during the first week after his speech and the
subsequent attack on Iraq that began on March 19, 2003.76
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As the war in Iraq dragged on in 2003 and 2004, and American troops
continued fighting in Afghanistan, President Bush’s approval rating continued to
steadily decline. Nevertheless, the approval rating was still at 53% in early
November of 2004, just prior to the 2004 presidential election.77 Bush was able
to defeat Democrat challenger John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election,
although the margin of victory was quite small, with Bush winning 50.73% of the
vote and 286 electoral votes.78 This represented the smallest margin of victory
for a sitting President who was re-elected.79 Nevertheless, Bush was re-elected.
A majority of Americans supported President Bush throughout his first
term, though they continued to be deeply affected by the 9/11 attacks. There
were a number of studies conducted which had similar findings. For instance,
immediately after the 9/11, 70% of Americans reported crying, 74% of Americans
reported praying more than they usually did, 71% of Americans said that they felt
depressed, over 90% thought that another terrorist attack in the United States
was either very likely or somewhat likely, and 82% of Americans reported
displaying an American flag.80 Approximately 88% of Americans in October of
2011 thought the American government was doing fairly well or very well in
reducing the threat of terrorism.81 About 61% of Americans in September of
2001 felt that is was necessary for the average person to give up some civil
liberties.82
It would be easy to argue that President Bush had an easier job than his
father or President Clinton had to persuade Americans to go to war on terrorism.
In considering Aristotle’s model, most would agree that American emotions in the
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immediate aftermath of 9/11, and even two years later, were so raw that it was
simple for Bush to appeal to those emotions in his advocacy, almost without
regard for his character or logical arguments. However, Bush was careful to go
beyond appealing to emotion alone. He very astutely defined the war on
terrorism and set the parameters for the United States involvement initially in the
war on terror and later for an expansion of the war on terror. Without doubt,
Bush appealed to the emotions of Americans, but he also set forth a logical
framework for his advocacy for American involvement, particularly for starting
and expanding military involvement in the war on terror.
The support for President Bush and the emotions noted above did not last
into Bush’s second term, but by that time, Bush’s vision for a response to 9/11
and his vision for an expanded war on terrorism had been put into motion.
President Bush did not run for re-election in 2008. By that time, the war on terror
had taken a toll on Americans. The domestic economy was struggling. The
country was ready for a new leader. President Barack Obama was elected in
November of 2008. The war on terror, however, was not over, and President
Obama would have his own decisions to make.
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Chapter IV: Assad’s Use of Poisonous Gas in Syria in 2013: A U.S. Military Response
or a Diplomatic Approach?

In August of 2013, Bashar al-Assad, President of Syria, ordered the use of
chemical weapons against Syrian citizens who were protesting his government. Almost
all of the victims, including men, women and children, were civilians. The attack,
however, was not an isolated incident, nor was it entirely unforeseen. Syria had been
experiencing unrest for years and on the brink of civil war since 2011, and Assad’s
troops had killed tens of thousands of people already. President Barack Obama and
the United States had been monitoring the situation, and in particular Assad’s potential
use of chemical weapons, for years. One year earlier, in August of 2012, in a statement
that would come back to haunt him, President Obama had issued what became to be
known as his “red line” statement, saying, “We have been very clear to the Assad
regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a
whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change
my calculus.”1 By utilizing chemical weapons, specifically poison gas, against his own
people, Assad had crossed Obama’s red line.
President Obama’s rhetoric and proposed response to Assad’s use of chemical
weapons, and the situation in Syria in general, was influenced by a number of factors,
including the presidential rhetoric and responses considered in earlier chapters. In
addition, the situation in Syria in 2013 shared some elements with Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait, the genocide in Kosovo and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. For instance, Assad,
like Saddam Hussein, was considered by world option to be a dictator and a rogue
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leader. Assad, like Milosevic, used mass genocide of his own country’s civilians as a
tactic in fighting a civil war. Moreover, beyond what Assad was doing domestically,
Syria’s links with Al-Qaeda, and in particular Osama bin Laden, brought a renewed fear
of potential terrorist use of chemical weapons against the United States in a post-9/11
world. An incident such as the use of chemical weapons against protestors, seemingly
isolated and occurring on the other side of the world, could escalate and could affect
Americans at home. It was time once again for the United States to gear up and make
ready for war. Or was it?
In the relatively short span of just over three weeks, President Barack Obama
began by strongly advocating a military response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons
and the situation in Syria, then moving to a position of considering both military and
diplomatic options, and finally moving to a position of diplomacy with the threat of
military force. President Obama’s movement along this spectrum of possible responses
was highlighted in three addresses. Obama addressed the nation from the Rose
Garden on August 31, 2013, calling the massacre “the worst chemical weapons attack
of the 21st century.”2 Obama addressed the nation again on September 10, 2013,
appearing to waver between the necessity for a strong military response and the
potential for a diplomatic resolution.3 Two weeks later, on September 24, 2013,
President Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly, confirming that the
American response was going to be diplomacy.4
The change in President Obama’s tone and policy recommendations in a matter
of only a few weeks was dramatic. The humanitarian concerns present when President
Clinton ordered the bombings in Kosovo were still present, and perhaps even
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magnified. The potential for escalation into regional conflict was still present. The
consideration of the cost of doing nothing that Obama was afraid might lead terrorist
groups to act more brazenly was still present. This chapter considers why President
Obama moved from his original position of using military force to address the situation
in Syria to a position of using diplomacy.5
The simple answer to that question may be that the political climate in the United
States in August 2013 would not support Obama’s initial advocacy of a military
response. However, if we consider Obama’s rhetoric in the aftermath of Assad’s use of
poisonous gas on his own people in the context of Aristotle’s model of persuasion, a
more complete answer is that, despite significant efforts to do so, President Obama was
unable to link his arguments for the use of military force to his appeals to the emotions
of the American public and members of Congress. After more than a decade of war,
Americans were exhausted. They may not have been emotionally numb, but they were
not easily outraged about events occurring on the other side of the world. Americans
simply did not feel strongly enough to support the use of military force in Syria.

A: The Situation: Syria
To better understand President Obama’s response to President Assad’s use of
chemical weapons in August 2013, some understanding of the Syrian civil war is
necessary.6 The civil war did not occur suddenly. Syria had endured centuries of
domestic conflict, but this most recent, and currently on-going, civil war had its origins in
Assad’s “election” as President in 2000. The unrest in Syria increased throughout the
first decade of the twenty-first century. By 2011 and 2012 there was significant fighting
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between protestors and troops loyal to Assad. The United States monitored the
situation closely. The Washington Post reported on January 26, 2012, about 18 months
prior to Assad’s use of chemical weapons, that then Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman, John F. Kerry, said that Syria was “pretty close” to civil war, and
that Kerry’s impression following a trip around the Middle East was that the situation in
Syria had “the feel” of a civil war.7 The civil war had been brewing for several years
during Assad’s presidency.
Bashar al-Assad effectively took over as President of Syria upon the death of his
father Hafez al-Assad in 2000. The elder Assad, a former general and Minister of
Defense, had seized power in the early 1970s and never relinquished it. Thus, while
Bashar al-Assad was elected President to succeed his father, the elections were not
necessarily free elections and were used as little more than justification for continuing
what had become a family dictatorship.8 However, Assad’s role as President actually
started on a bright note. Syria had experienced a bit of the Arab spring in 2000, and
Assad allowed talk of “reform” to occur, informally and more formally in political forums
that had sprung around the country. 9 This period of open discussion, however, ended
quickly as Assad began to crack down on reformers, sometimes violently, in late 2001.
The increasing unrest in Syria during Assad’s rule also had an important
religious element. President Assad’s family belonged to the Alawite religious tradition,
linked with Shi’ite Muslims. However, Alawites comprised only about 12% of the Syrian
population. The majority of the Syrian population, about 74%, followed the Sunni
Muslim tradition. Thus, some opposition to Assad’s rule derived not just from a desire
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for reform, but also had roots in long-standing religious conflicts between the branches
of the Muslim faith.10
After about a decade of skirmishes with protestors, primarily political, but
religious as well, the situation turned increasingly violent in 2011. The protestors were a
mix of primarily younger people who were either Sunnis or pro-democracy or both. Prodemocracy protests erupted in March of 2011 in the city of Deraa after some teenagers
who had painted anti-government slogans on a wall allegedly were arrested and
tortured. Syrian troops were called in to quell the protests and opened fire, killing
several protesters.11 This incident led to more organized, broader protests in a number
of areas around Syria. By July of 2011, hundreds of thousands of protestors were
taking to the streets in many cities in Syria.12 The protestors began to take up arms,
and eventually the protestors went on the offensive, attacking local security troops.13
Fighting between various protestor groups, now self-called rebels, and government
troops reached the capital city of Damascus and the second largest city of Aleppo by
mid-2012. By June of 2013, approximately 90,000 people had been killed, with
hundreds of thousands more displaced from their homes.14
The world took notice after the unrest expanded. A United Nations inquiry
launched in 2011 found evidence of human rights violations and war crimes on both
sides of the conflict, including murder, torture and rape.15 In addition, the United
Nations found that both sides in the conflict used human suffering as a weapon, by
blocking or restricting access to food, water and health services to members of the other
side.16 However, the United Nations investigation appeared to be almost meaningless,
and the United Nations took no concrete action to intervene. Thus, the situation in
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August of 2013, when President Assad authorized the use of chemical weapons by
government troops against protestors, had eroded into near civil war, if not outright civil
war, with both political and religious issues playing a role.

B: The Situation: President Obama’s Character and the Political Climate in the United
States in 2013
i.

The election and re-election of President Obama

President Barack Obama was the first African-American elected President and
he came in to office with a sparkling, almost unblemished record. President Obama had
originally been elected President in November of 2008, running on a platform that
included, among other goals, the ending of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama
had defeated Senator John McCain, a decorated war veteran and a decidedly more
hawkish supporter of United States military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan,
winning 52.9% of popular vote and decidedly winning the electoral vote 365-173.17 This
election victory for Obama followed a very fast rise in politics, first as a community
organizer in Chicago, then as a legislator in the Illinois state senate, and then as a
United States Senator for Illinois.18 Obama was able to defuse what was probably the
only true crisis situation of his campaign against McCain when he denounced sermons
given by his former pastor, Reverend Jeremiah White, in which White had questioned
whether the United States was to blame for the 9/11 attacks and also whether the
federal government was to blame for the proliferation of AIDS as a way to control
people of color.19
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Obama had also been steadfast in his opposition to the war in Iraq during his
campaign. The American people were tired of war in 2008. He delivered a significant
address at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, on February 27, 2009, less than a month
after being sworn in as President, in which he set a timetable for the withdrawal of
American troops from Iraq.20 Obama then largely kept to the timetable he proposed,
which earned him significant personal capital and a Nobel Peace Prize. However, it
also became quickly clear that the situation in Iraq was not as stable as desired and that
the United States would not be able to consider the situation a problem solved. In
addition, at the same time President Obama was drawing down troops in Iraq, he was
significantly increasing American troops in Afghanistan.21 Thus, American military
involvement in the Middle East was far from over.
During the next election in 2012, President Obama won by a much closer margin,
defeating Romney, but only earning 51.1% of the popular vote and 332 electoral
votes.22 The election victory was not exactly a ringing endorsement of Obama’s first
term. By August of 2013, President Obama was enduring a tough first year of his
second term as President. Obama and his administration were facing significant
criticism and opposition to some of its foreign policies. To be clear, there were also a
number of domestic issues on Obama’s agenda, most of them carried over from his first
term, including righting a sluggish economy, health care, immigration and others.

ii.

The political climate with domestic and foreign policies

In the domestic arena in 2013, President Obama faced numerous issues left over
from his first term. For instance, Obama had to work through significant budget issues,

111

a sequestration vote, challenges to his immigration policy and, of course, continued
debate about the necessity of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which had
been signed into law in March of 2009 and rolled out with numerous problems over the
next few years.23 The health care issue, in particular, was divisive along party lines. All
of these issues were still cause for concern in August of 2013, and all presented hurdles
to overcome when President Obama proposed a new military initiative in Syria in his
August 31, 2013, Rose Garden address.
In the foreign policy arena, President Obama had been able to take credit for the
successful assassination of Al-Qaeda Leader Osama bin Laden by Navy Seals on May
1, 2011.24 The political capital he earned from this victory, however, was long since
spent by August of 2013. Obama also had to deal with the fall-out of a deadly attack on
the United States embassy in Benghazi, Libya, by Muslin extremists on September 11,
2012, in which the United States ambassador and others were killed. In another blow to
the administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was accused of attempting to cover
up not only what had happened in Benghazi, but what American security measures
were – or were not – in place.25 The fall-out had not significantly affected the
Presidential election held in November 2012, but Secretary of State Clinton’s testimony
before the House of Representatives in January 2013 did not go well, and the
investigations into and allegations of cover-up were still on-going in the summer of
2013.
President Obama also had to acknowledge and account for the diminishing
American appetite for war in 2013. Americans felt battle fatigue acutely. The war in
Iraq was “over,” or at least winding down, but the war in Afghanistan continued.
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American servicemen were still fighting and dying in the Middle East. Americans had
been tired of fighting when Obama was elected in 2008. Now, five years later, and after
more than a decade of war in the Middle East, Americans were even more tired of
fighting. This was the political setting in August 2013 when President Obama
responded to the use of chemical weapons by President Assad in Syria.

iii.

Could President Obama rely on personal character to bolster his rhetoric?

Unlike President George H.W. Bush, President Obama did not have a
distinguished military record. Obama had not served as an Envoy or Director of Central
Intelligence or Vice-President. Also, though George W. Bush had a limited foreign
policy background when he was elected, he was able to capitalize on and appeal to the
immediate fear and anger and other strong emotions that most Americans felt in the
years immediately following 9/11. President Obama did not have either the experience
of George H.W. Bush or the immediacy of an attack on American soil. In many ways,
Obama’s background was more like President Clinton’s. A major difference, however,
was that Obama did not have to overcome the significant challenges to his integrity or
character that Clinton faced. In addition, by 2013, Obama had significant experience as
President. But, because of continuing battles with Congress about significant domestic
policy issues that had diminished his personal capital, Obama had to rely on the
authority of the office of the President when he addressed the nation following Assad’s
use of chemical weapons.
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C: The Rhetoric
President Obama addressed Assad’s use of chemical weapons in three
addresses that covered a spectrum of response, beginning with advocating for a strong
military response, then leaning toward a mixed military response, and then ending with
a commitment to use diplomacy. Obama’s movement along that spectrum occurred
over a relatively short, twenty-five day period beginning on August 31, 2013, and ending
on September 24, 2013.

i.

An initial strong response from President Obama

President Obama addressed the nation on August 31, 2013, from the Rose
Garden. He announced that, “Ten days ago, the world watched in horror as men,
women and children were massacred in Syria in the worst chemical weapons attack of
the 21st century.”26 He went on to say that there was strong evidence that the Syrian
government was responsible for the attack on its own people.27 President Obama gave
an impassioned argument for a strong response, including the use of military force, to
President Assad of Syria. However, from the very beginning, Obama seemed
ambivalent about the seriousness of the situation and the appropriateness of a military
response by the United States.
For instance, the timing and setting of the address were curious. President
Obama chose not to address the American people from the symbolic power of the Oval
Office or in front of a joint session of Congress. Instead, he chose to make his address
from the Rose Garden, on the White House grounds. To be fair, the Rose Garden was
often used by Obama for announcements during the warmer months, but it was also
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used for more ceremonial functions, such as greeting dignitaries and school children
and championship athletic teams. In addition, President Obama chose to make the
announcement in the mid-afternoon on a Saturday over Labor Day weekend rather than
in prime-time during the work week, when far more Americans would be watching their
televisions. Thus, neither the setting nor the timing of the address appeared to lend the
expected gravitas associated with what Obama called “the worst chemical weapons
attack of the 21st century,” and a call for a strong military response.
Nevertheless, President Obama made his case. He claimed that “well over
1,000 people were murdered” in the chemical weapons attack.28 It was not the number
of people who had died – remember 90,000 people had already died in fighting over the
last three years, with hundreds of thousands more displaced – but the fact that
President Assad’s troops had used chemical weapons. The use of chemical weapons
was “an assault on human dignity” and it represented a “serious danger to our (United
States) national security.”29 It was, largely, because Assad had used chemical weapons
that Obama felt so strongly. The use of chemical weapons by Assad moved him from
participation in a civil war with allegations of genocide against protestors of his regime
to the use of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the use of chemical weapons
had long been considered taboo, with most countries in the world signing treaties
banning their use.30
President Obama also tried to make the case that the United States had to worry
about the escalation of violence in the Middle East and the proliferation of terrorism: “It
endangers our friends and our partners along Syria’s borders, including Israel, Jordan,
Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq. It could lead to escalating use of chemical weapons, or their
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proliferation to terrorist groups who would do our people harm.”31 Obama was warning
that in a post-9/11 world, it could be disastrous for chemical weapons to fall into the
hands of terrorists.
Obama felt, though, that the implications of the attack went beyond chemical
warfare. He felt that if “we,” meaning the United States, did not “enforce accountability
in the face of this heinous act, what (did) it say about our resolve to stand up to others
who flout fundamental international rules?”32 President Obama was concerned that the
United States needed to show its resolve to confront countries and terrorist groups that
could harm the United States with nuclear arms, biological weapons, and armies who
carried out genocide.33 The United States had suffered a blow to its role as a world
leader with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. And, though the United States had reacted
strongly and militarily, sending troops into Afghanistan and then into Iraq, those wars
had become bogged down and had been on-going for over a decade in 2013. Obama
may have felt that a strong, military response to Assad would assist the United States to
regain some of its world leader status.
President Obama also made the argument that the United States had a
responsibility, a moral responsibility, to the protestors in Syria. He stated that
Americans believed that the “rights of individuals to live in peace and dignity depends
on the responsibilities of nations. We aren’t perfect, but this nation more than any other
has been willing to meet those responsibilities.”34 This approach was similar to the
approaches of the other post-Cold War presidents considered above. President George
H.W. Bush stated that sometimes we are “called upon to define who we are and what
we believe.”35 President Clinton called the bombing of Kosovo “a moral imperative.”36
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President George W. Bush stated that the “advance of freedom . . . depends on us.” 37
Each of these Presidents had also attempted to demonstrate that he was advocating for
a decision that was the right or moral decision for America.
President Obama continued, stating that America need to show the world that
“America keeps our commitments. We do what we say. And we lead with the belief
that right makes might – not the other way around.”38 America, according to Obama
might act on the premise that it was fulfilling its moral responsibility to the world, a
general moral responsibility and not just fulfilling his “red line” promise, by responding to
Assad with military action. This approach also reinforced the idea that the United
States, though battered by long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, remained not only on the
side of “right,” but remained a world power on the side of “right.” Obama’s conclusion
was that he believed the United States should take action, and his plan was that “the
United States should take military action against Syrian regime targets,” but he also
acknowledged that he had some significant hurdles to clear.39
Congress was the first hurdle Obama faced, and Obama had to reconcile the
moral imperative for military action that he had described with the political reality in
August of 2013. For reasons discussed above, including multiple contentious domestic
issues such as the economy, health care and immigration, as well as foreign policy
issues such as the slow withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, President Obama had a
rocky relationship with Congress in August 2013. Thus, Obama had to walk a fine line
between reserving the power of the President to use military force and the political
reality of needing to involve Congress in the decision. While Obama stated that he had
“made the decision” to use military force as Commander-in-Chief, and while he was
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“prepared to give that order,” he further stated he was nevertheless mindful that he was
“President of the world’s oldest constitutional democracy,” and that he had made a
“second decision” to seek authorization for the use of military force from Congress. 40
Referring to the moral imperative to act discussed above, Obama stated that American
values dictated a response to this “massacre,” but he also stated that “our democracy is
stronger when the President and the people’s representatives stand together.” 41
Obama may also have been ambivalent and truly wanting a second opinion.
This approach contrasts with the approach taken by President George H.W.
Bush in announcing the commencement of Desert Storm. President George H. W.
Bush ordered a military intervention without involving Congress. Admittedly, Bush set
up a “defensive” posture first by putting troops in Saudi Arabia to “protect” a United
States “ally,” but he did not hesitate to warn Saddam Hussein of the impending
movement of United States troops into Kuwait and subsequently follow through with
quick and decisive military action during Desert Storm.
President Obama’s approach also stands in contrast to the approach taken by
President William Clinton in announcing the American participation in the air strikes in
Kosovo. In 1999, President Clinton felt acutely the lessons of the war in Bosnia and
wanted to avoid further genocide. Clinton ordered the Kosovo airstrikes and then
justified them afterwards. The situation in Syria, and the humanitarian reasons for
intervening with military force, may seem analogous at first glance, but times had
changed. When Clinton made his decision in 1999, the United States had not been
involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq stretching back over a decade. President
Obama had to account for American battle fatigue.
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Obama’s approach also stands in contrast to the approach taken by George W.
Bush following 9/11. In the aftermath of 9/11, with American emotions running high,
President George W. Bush did not have to worry about Congressional consent to use of
military force. Members of Congress wanted to authorize the use of military force to
demonstrate that they were helping the President in the new war on terrorism. An
authorization of force bill was signed into law only three days after 9/11. The feeling
that reaction must be immediate, however, was not present twelve years later when
Assad used chemical weapons. Assad’s use of chemical weapons had not occurred on
American soil. Neither American troops nor American citizens had been put in danger.
And, after more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, Congress was not about
to jump quickly into another military effort despite the use of a weapon of mass
destruction.
The voice and spirit of the American people proved to be a second hurdle for
President Obama. As was the case in his dealing with Congress, Obama also had to
walk a fine line with the American people. He acknowledged that, “I know well that we
are weary of war.”42 He continued, “We ended one war in Iraq. We’re ending another in
Afghanistan. And the American people have the good sense to know we cannot resolve
the underlying conflict in Syria with our military.”43 He stated that while he respected the
views of those who called for “caution,” and acknowledged that that America was
emerging from a time of war he had “been elected in part to end,”44 America needed to
respond with military action. Obama tried to gain the confidence of American citizens
and find common ground, claiming that his proposed military action was not going to be
an “open-ended” intervention, and there would be no “boots on the ground,” but that he
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felt that the cost of doing nothing was greater than the cost of acting with a strong show
of military force.45

ii.

Use of military force or diplomacy?

President Obama next addressed the nation on the situation in Syria ten days
later on September 10, 2013. The address was confusing because Obama seemed to
equivocate. He reiterated his disgust for the use of chemical weapons by Syrian
President Assad and reiterated his case for using military force, but then said he had
asked Congress to delay a vote on the use of military force because diplomacy
appeared to be working. For instance, Syria seemed to be willing to discuss a
discontinuance of its use of chemical weapons, as long as Russian President Vladimir
Putin was involved as an intermediary in the discussions. Syria had a long standing
relationship with Russia, and, apparently felt more comfortable negotiating with Russia.
Using Russia as an intermediary was probably a way for Syria to “save face” as well.
President Obama was unclear about what course of action he wanted to follow.
Apparently, Obama wanted to try to keep all options open, and pursue a course that
would be supported by all viewpoints, all while buying some time to see what Assad
would do next.
For instance, Obama began the address with an admission that “we” (the United
States) could not resolve the civil war in Syria. He stated that, “I have resisted calls for
military action, because we cannot resolve someone else’s civil war through force,
particularly after a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.”46 Compare Obama’s
approach here to Clinton’s approach with Kosovo. President Clinton had at least been
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able to stop, if not resolve, the civil war in Kosovo, but, again, times had changed by the
time President Obama had to react to Assad’s use of chemical weapons in 2013.
Clinton had the advantage that NATO was at least interested in Kosovo, although
Clinton certainly took a risk that the bombings would work. NATO was not interested in
Syria, but Russia and China were. Given the political climate and the battle fatigue of
Americans in 2013, President Obama seemed to realize that he just could not afford to
attempt to liken the situation in Syria to the situation in Kosovo. Given the difference in
times and all that the United States had been through in Afghanistan and Iraq, President
Obama could not simply tap into the emotions of the American public as easily in
August of 2013 as Clinton had in 1999.
Instead, President Obama began a more thoughtful, public consideration of
diplomatic options alongside his advocacy of military intervention. Obama stated “over
the last few days,” we have seen some “encouraging signs” that diplomacy was
working.47 In part because of the “credible threat of U.S. military action,” and
discussions involving Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Assad, the
Syrian government had at least acknowledged that it had chemical weapons and was
open to joining the Chemical Weapons Convention which prohibited their use. 48 These
sentiments seemingly indicated that diplomacy was working and seemingly contradicted
President Obama’s position from a mere ten days earlier stating that quick and decisive
military intervention was the most appropriate response.
However, in other parts of the address, President Obama continued his advocacy
for a military response with rhetoric reminiscent of the rhetoric used by George Bush,
William Clinton and George W. Bush. Perhaps, Obama did not want to completely
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forego a military option. Like the other post-Cold War presidents before him, Obama
used arguments appealing to emotions and appealing to logic to make his case. For
instance, Obama spoke of “dictators” who “commit atrocities.”49 George Bush had
referred to Saddam Hussein as a dictator. Clinton had referred to Milosevic as a
dictator. All of them were conjuring the memory of Hitler as a dictator and the slaughter
he had caused. This was an appeal to emotion, using what each considered a shared
American perception of history.
Obama stated that humanitarian organizations had told stories after the attack of
“hospitals packed with people who had symptoms of poison gas.”50 Clinton had used a
“humanitarian” justification for the Kosovo bombings. Again, by highlighting the horrible
effects of the use of chemical weapons, Obama was appealing to emotion. He was also
hedging his bets by not completely letting go of the idea of a potential military response.
Obama spoke of a “violation of international law” and a “threat to our security.” 51
George H.W. Bush had called Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait a violation of international
law.52 Clinton called the genocide perpetrated by Milosevic a violation of international
law.53 George W. Bush called the terrorist acts of 9/11 a violation of international law
and a threat to United States security.54 These arguments appealed to logic, or more
specifically, to logic connected with emotion. Without some legal order in the world,
what was to stop terrorists acting at will?
Obama worried about “escalation” of violence in the Middle East.55 He spoke of
the “burdens of leadership.”56 He stated, “Our ideals and principles, as well as our
national security, are at stake in Syria . . .”57 George Bush worried about the potential
for the escalation of war in the Middle East if Iraq were simply allowed to take over
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Kuwait.58 Clinton worried about the escalation of violence in Eastern Europe if Milosevic
were not stopped.59 George W. Bush argued that the United States must engage in
military action in Afghanistan and later in Iraq to prevent an escalation of terrorism
against the United States and around the world.60 All of them argued that the United
States must take a leadership role. This line of reasoning had elements of logic and
emotion. Logically, it could be argued that if the United States did not take a stand in
each of these decisions, no other countries could or would take a stand. Emotionally,
these Presidents appealed the American sense of being a world leader with a moral
responsibility to lead.
Thus, in his September 10, 2013, address, Obama made all of the same
arguments he had made ten days earlier in support of using military force, and many of
these arguments were quite similar to the arguments put forth by George Bush, William
Clinton and George W. Bush before him. However, this address was so interesting
because Obama was trying to advocate a diplomatic response at the same time.
Despite all of the strong rhetoric advocating a military response, and despite the
stating that he had authority to order a military response, the course of action that
President Obama chose (at least for then) was diplomacy. He spoke of Secretary of
State John Kerry meeting with his Russian counterpart and his own continued
discussions with Russian President Putin.61 These discussions were apparently going
well. Obama spoke of working with Great Britain, France and China to put forward a
resolution to the United Nations Security Council.62 Despite the earlier less than
interested response from the United Nations, it appeared that members of the United
Nations were becoming interested in playing an active role. Thus, President Obama
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specifically referred to his request to Congress to delay its vote on the use of military
force.63 Diplomacy, with a threat of military force, and not military force itself, appeared
to be President Obama’s new position.

iii.

Confirming a course of diplomacy with a threat of military force

Two weeks after his second address to the American people about his
planned response of diplomacy with a threat of military force to Syrian President
Assad’s use of chemical weapons, and three-and-one-half weeks after his initial
address strongly advocating a military response, President Obama addressed the
United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 2013. In his remarks, Obama
addressed a number of international issues, but first and foremost he addressed the
situation in Syria. Obama confirmed that he would pursue a diplomatic option in Syria,
but that the threat of military force was necessary to make diplomacy more effective and
powerful.
Obama began his discussion of the situation in Syria by reminding the United
Nations of what he believed the United Nations role should be. In short, Obama stated
that the international community, working through the United Nations Security Council,
“must enforce the ban on chemical weapons.”64 He stated that “98 percent of humanity”
had agreed to the ban on the use of chemical weapons, with the implication that the
other two percent must be rogue nations or terrorists or worse.65 He reminded the
United Nations of the history associated with the use of chemical weapons, of the
“searing memories of soldiers suffocating in the trenches, Jews slaughtered in gas
chambers, Iranians poisoned. . .”66 In that single sentence, Obama recalled World War
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I, World War II and the Iraq-Iran War. Obama stated that the evidence that Syrian
President Assad had used chemical weapons on his own people was “overwhelming.” 67
According to Obama, the United Nations had to act.
President Obama defended his use of a threat of military force, with or without a
Security Council mandate. He further justified the United State threat of military force,
in part, by stating it was necessary to make the United Nations take notice: “without a
credible military threat, the (United Nations) Security Council had demonstrated no
inclination to act at all.”68 He tempered that statement, however, stating immediately
afterward that, “However . . . my preference has always been a diplomatic resolution to
this issue. And in the past several weeks, the United States, Russia and our allies have
reached an agreement to place Syria’s chemical weapons under international control,
and then to destroy them.”(Emphasis added.)69 In addition to the words italicized in this
last quote, the other key words were probably “in the past several weeks” because, as
will be discussed below, much had happened between the time Obama initially called
for a military response and this address where Obama embraced diplomacy and called
on the United Nations to follow up and verify that Assad was keeping his word.
President Obama concluded the Syria portion of his remarks to the United
Nations General Assembly by reiterating that the United States was “committed to
working this political track.”70 In other words, Obama was looking for a political solution
rather than a military solution. He reminded the world that the Cold War was over, and
that the American interest in Syria was solely “the wellbeing of its people, the stability of
its neighbors, the elimination of chemical weapons, and ensuring that it does not
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become a safe haven for terrorists.”71 He welcomed “the influence of all nations” that
could assist in bringing about “a peaceful resolution to Syria’s civil war.”72
Thus, in a short, three and one half week span, President Obama went from
advocating for a strong military response to Syrian President Assad’s use of chemical
weapons against his own people to advocating for a decidedly more diplomatic
approach. He moved from arguing that the use of chemical weapons was a threat to
American security to arguing that it was a broader, international threat. He moved from
arguing that American had a specific, moral responsibility to act, to arguing that the
international community had a responsibility to act. Obama moved from arguing that
the United States should consider acting alone to stating that the United States would
work with the international community.

D: Congressional and Public Response
The key to understanding President Obama’s movement from a position on
August 31, 2013, of advocating for a strong military response to Assad’s use of
chemical weapons to a position on September 10, 2013, of advocating for a strong
military response, but looking toward a potential diplomatic resolution, to a position on
September 24, 2013, of embracing a diplomatic response with the assistance of the
United Nations is to look at what was occurring in public opinion during that 24-day
period during September 2013. Internationally, discussions were on-going between the
United States and Russia and Russia and Syria, which seemed to be bringing Assad
into line with the ideas of destroying Syria’s chemical weapons and having that
destruction monitored. President Obama, however, also faced significant resistance to
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military action domestically, both from members of Congress and from the American
public, and he began to realize that his appeals to the emotions of Americans, including
members of Congress were not having the effect he expected.

i.

Congressional Action

President Obama addressed the nation from the Rose Garden on August 31,
2013, about Assad’s use of chemical weapons. He knew he had an uphill battle in
Congress even before the address. Republicans held a 234-201 seat margin the House
of Representatives, and Democrats held a 53-45 seat margin in the Senate.73 Any
successful vote authorizing military force would have to be in some part bipartisan.
However, Obama was in a difficult position because, as noted above, he had drawn a
“red line” during a news conference about one year earlier in August of 2012. President
Obama said in 2012 that the United States was monitoring Assad’s stockpiling of
chemical and biological weapons very carefully, but Assad would cross a “red line” if he
started moving or using those chemical weapons.74 Assad clearly appeared to have
crossed this red line drawn by Obama, so, politically, Obama was under pressure to act.
Many Republican leaders in Congress, including House Speaker John Boehner,
urged Obama to act and act quickly. Boehner sent Obama a detailed letter on August
28, 2013, three days prior to Obama’s Rose Garden address, in which Boehner said he
had determined that Assad had crossed Obama’s red line, and in which he urged
Obama to set forth his planned response.75 Boehner asked a series of questions in the
letter, almost all of which concerned the use of military force to respond to Assad. 76
Although Boehner was not against the use of military force, and in fact he seemed to be
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urging the use of military force, he seemed to be asking Obama to make a case to
Congress and the American people for using military force, stating that “after 12 years
of fighting,” we “all have a better appreciation” of the costs of entering war, and
reminding Obama that he would need the support of Congress and the American
people to enter into and sustain a military action against Assad.77
Boehner’s letter to Obama was important because it not only contained elements
of the argument for obtaining Congressional authorization, but it also contained a
warning that the American public had to be won over before Congress would be won
over. This was in fact how the domestic response to Obama’s initial advocacy for a
military response played out. The public did not embrace Obama’s position, and
therefore Congress did not embrace Obama’s position. Congress also did not attempt
to bend public opinion in favor of a military response. Ultimately, Obama back-tracked,
but this all occurred before Obama’s initial Rose Garden address on Assad’s use of
poisonous gas in Syria.
On August 30, 2013, two days after Boehner’s letter and one day prior to
President Obama’s Rose Garden address, there was still a lot of debate occurring in
Congress about how the President and the United States should respond to Assad’s
use of chemical weapons. And though there was some minor debate about whether the
President must consult Congress, there seemed to be consensus from both sides of the
aisle that Obama should consult Congress before authorizing any military action in
response to Assad. According to one Republican representative, more than ninety
members of Congress, most Republicans, signed a letter to President Obama urging
him to consult Congress and receive authorization for use of military action.78 In
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addition, fifty-four Democrats sent a letter to Obama stating “we strongly urge you to
seek an affirmative decision of Congress prior to committing any U.S. military
engagement to this complex crisis.”79
President Obama requested authorization from Congress to respond militarily in
his August 31, 2013, address from the Rose Garden. By doing so, though, he invited
debate. Members of Congress were far from unified. As of September 4, the majority
of Representatives were either against the use of military force or were leaning toward a
“no” vote or were undecided, and this was in the House where Republicans had a
majority.80 Debate in the Senate was similarly not definitive. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee approve a resolution on September 4 authorizing the use of
military force, but there was not a sure majority in the full Senate that thought the
same.81
This uncertainty in both the House and Senate, coupled with the apparent
progress of United States talks with Assad through President Putin of Russia, resulted
in Obama being appearing more open to diplomacy in his September 10, 2013,
address, than he had been in his initial August 31st address. Ultimately, he later
expressed a preference for diplomacy in his September 24, 2013, address to the United
Nations. Apparently, President Obama originally favored a military response, or at least
wanted to have that option, but he assumed he did not have the votes before his August
31, 2013, address, so he opted to request Congressional authorization. However, once
he made that request, it only stirred up more debate. Without the votes for certain
authorization, Obama then requested that Congress delay voting on a military response
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in his September 10, 2013, address, and he let the issue go by the time he addressed
the United Nations on September 24, 2013.

ii.

Public Response

The simple reason that Congress was hesitant to support President Obama’s
plan for a military response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons against his own people
was because most Americans were not ready to support a military response. As
Obama acknowledged in both the August 31, 2013, address and the September 10,
2013, address, Americans were tired of fighting wars in the Middle East. Thus, while
the humanitarian aspect of military intervention and the potential for escalation of
violence and unrest in the region might have made the situation seem analogous to the
situation Clinton faced in Kosovo, given all they had suffered with wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, Americans were not ready to jump back into war - - even a limited military
action with no boots on the ground and even when poisonous gas had been used.
A Pew Research Center poll conducted over Labor Day weekend, August 29,
2013 – September 1, 2013, (recall that President Obama made his Rose Garden
address on August 31, 2013), found that public opinion was running against conducting
airstrikes in Syria. About 50% of Democrats and 50% of independents and 40% of
Republicans were “against” airstrikes, with over another 20% of Democrats,
independents and Republicans undecided.82 Overall, only about 29% of respondents
favored conducting airstrikes.83 About 74% of respondents were concerned about a
backlash against the United States from conducting airstrikes, while 61% of
respondents were concerned that airstrikes could lead to a long-term military
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commitment in Syria, and only about 33% of respondents thought airstrikes would be an
effective deterrent against the further use of chemical weapons by Assad.84
The public response did not become more supportive in the time between
President Obama’s August 31, 2013, address and his September 10, 2013, address. A
CNN poll conducted from September 6-8, 2013, found that 59% of respondents felt that
Congress should not authorize the use of military force.85 About 55% of respondents
opposed United States airstrikes even if Congress authorized them, and 71% of
respondents opposed airstrikes if Congress did not authorize them.86 In addition, as
was the case with the earlier poll, a great majority, 72%, of respondents felt that
airstrikes would not achieve significant goals for the United States.87 With this lack of
public support for military action, it was not a difficult decision for President Obama to
ask Congress to delay holding a vote in his September 10, 2013, address.
A Gallup poll conducted September 3-4, 2013, provided a comparison between
Americans’ support for military action in Syria as compared support for military action,
prior to its commencement, in the other conflicts considered in this paper. The Gallup
poll found that only 36% of respondents favored military action in Syria. 88 In contrast,
55% of Americans favored a military response following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
43% favored the bombings in Kosovo; 82% favored military action in Afghanistan in
October of 2001, immediately after the 9/11 attacks; 64% of Americans favored military
action in Iraq in March of 2003.89 Even in Kosovo, perhaps the most similar of
situations, the “rally effect” pushed support for the bombings to 51% after they had
occurred.90 Here, however, President Obama could not depend upon any rally effect.
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President Obama began September 2013 with a 49% disapproval rating and only
a 43% approval rating.91 Following his September 10, 2013, address in which he
discussed giving diplomacy a chance and asked Congress to delay a vote on the
authorization of the use of military force, Obama’s approval rating rose only
incrementally to 44% and he still had a 46% disapproval rating.92 Given the public
reticence about taking military action in Syria, and the resulting Congressional reticence
about authorizing such military action, coupled with the apparent, at least short-term
success of diplomatic efforts, Obama chose diplomacy.
Obama’s relatively rapid movement from advocacy of military action in response
to Assad’s use of chemical weapons on his own people to support of a diplomatic
resolution can be attributed to a number of factors. He realized he did not have the
personal capital remaining in order to persuade Congress or the American public that
military action in Syria was necessary. More importantly, despite good, logical
arguments, including arguments similar to arguments made by other post-Cold War
presidents, President Obama was just not able to connect his arguments to a
successful appeal to the emotions of Americans. Americans were just too worn out
from years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq to care as deeply about Assad and Syria
as they had cared when other post-Cold War Presidents had advocated for the use of
military force.

Postscript
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Following the actions of the Islamic State, sometimes referred to as ISIS or ISIL,
in 2014, including the beheading of American citizens, President Obama renewed his
call for airstrikes in Syria, which, with Iraq, was suspected of harboring and aiding
Islamic State terrorists. Obama gave an impassioned address on September 10, 2014,
just over one year after Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, calling
for airstrikes in Syria and citing both humanitarian grounds and counterterrorism as
justification.93 The beheading of American citizens was apparently enough to re-stir the
emotions of the American people and Congress. Airstrikes began and have been ongoing. However, the results and consequences of the airstrikes are not yet clear. As
this is being written, in March of 2015, President Obama is seeking Congressional
authority to put troops in Syria in addition to the airstrikes that are on-going.
The more recent emotions felt by Americans, including members of Congress,
following the beheading of American citizens and others, were strong. In our concluding
section, when comparing the four incidents and four post-Cold War Presidents
considered above, we see that emotions and the President’s ability to link his
arguments to strong emotions and appeal to those emotions represent the key to
successful advocacy for use of military action.
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Conclusion

In considering the four post-Cold War Presidents, and the specific incidents when
each attempted to use rhetoric to advocate for the use of military force, we see that the
factors of character, logic and appeal to emotion considered by Aristotle remain relevant
factors to consider today. Each factor was relevant to understanding how effective each
President was in his use of rhetoric as a call to war. However, the analysis
demonstrated that each factor was not necessarily equally important for each speaker.
In fact, while character could be important, it was not critical, or at least not as critical as
it may have been to Aristotle. While logical arguments were important, they were
ultimately only as successful as the speaker’s ability to connect those arguments to
emotion and appeal to the emotions of the listener. Of the three factors, successfully
understanding and appealing to emotions was the key to persuasion. In the case
studies presented in this thesis, Presidents George H.W. Bush, William Clinton, and
George W. Bush successfully understood and appealed to the emotions of their
listeners and were able to persuade their listeners that United States military action was
necessary. President Barack Obama did not successfully understand the emotions of
his audience, and, though he tried to appeal to emotions, he ultimately failed to make a
winning case for use of military force.
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i.

The personal character of the speaker was not as important as it may
have been to Aristotle.

The character of the speaker, even when the speaker is the President of the
United States (or maybe because the speaker is the President of the United States),
was not as important as it may have been in Aristotle’s time. Aristotle said, “We believe
good men more fully and more readily than others . . .”1 When the speaker is the
President, however, we saw character imputed by personal experience prior to
becoming President, experience as President, family name and other factors. For
instance, personal character was a large factor in President George H.W. Bush’s
rhetoric and his successful call to war in the context of the Gulf War. Remember, the
United States had not been involved in a major war since Vietnam. President Bush was
a decorated World War II veteran, and had served as Director of Central Intelligence,
had been Special Envoy to China, had been an Ambassador to the United Nations, and
had served as Vice-President. Bush had significant foreign policy credentials. He was
able to parlay that experience and the personal character it imputed to present himself
as a believable and thoughtful and trustworthy speaker when he announced first
Operation Desert Shield and then Operation Desert Storm. In part due to his personal
character, President Bush was able to help Americans overcome the uncomfortable
legacy of Vietnam and restore the American belief that it should play a role in world
leadership.
However, contrast the character imputed to Bush based on his experience before
being elected President with the character imputed - - or more specifically, not imputed - to his successors based on their pre-Presidential experiences. This form of imputed
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personal character seemed to become less important to the effectiveness of the rhetoric
calling Congress and other Americans to war. Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush and
Obama did not extensive foreign policy experience, though Presidents Clinton and
Obama had significant time in office at the times we considered them. Instead, other
factors, such as the symbolism of the office of the President, imputed a certain amount
character to its occupant. The character of the office overrode the character of the
person, especially in times of crisis.
One key, therefore, in having the character of the office of the President imputed
to the President was for the President to successfully define his particular situation as a
time of crisis. Presidents George H.W. Bush and William Clinton were successful in
defining their situations as crisis situations where the President would be expected and
required to act, and specifically to take military action. President George. W. Bush,
responding to 9/11 did not have to work to define that situation as a crisis, though he did
work to define the crisis requiring expansion of the war on terror and the attack on Iraq.
President Obama tried but failed to successfully define President Assad’s use of poison
gas in Syria as a crisis requiring Presidential action beyond diplomacy.
President William Clinton provided perhaps the best example of defining the
Kosovo situation as a crisis and of the character of the office of the Presidency being
imputed to him. Clinton was in the midst of the fall-out from a personal scandal with
intern Monica Lewinsky at the time he announced the United States participation in the
Kosovo bombings. This was not the first time President Clinton’s personal character
had been called into question. In addition, President Clinton had little or no foreign
policy experience when he was first elected President. And, not only was Clinton not a
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decorated veteran as President Bush had been before him, Clinton had expressed antiwar sentiments and the question of whether he had been a draft-dodger had been
raised during his initial campaign for office. However, while Clinton lacked credibility
and could not necessarily use his personal character to persuade Congress and the
American people of the necessity to participate in the Kosovo bombings, he was still the
President of the United States. He made the case that Kosovo was a crisis situation
and that America needed to rally around its President. Personal character turned out to
not be as important as the character of the office of the presidency. Clinton was able to
use the character of the office of the President to support his rhetoric and he did so
effectively.
President George W. Bush, like Clinton, did not have a sparkling resume of
personal achievement when 9/11 occurred, less than one year into his presidency.
Bush did not have a foreign policy background, nor had he served in a number of highlevel positions like his father. Like Clinton, there was a whiff of controversy about his
personal life, including allegations of excessive drinking, and about his military service.
Bush’s tour with the National Guard had been a significant campaign issue. However,
as was the case with Clinton, personal character turned out to be unimportant, although
for a different reason. While George W. Bush did indeed use the character of the office
of the presidency to support his call to war in the aftermath of 9/11, his appeal to the
emotions of members of Congress and all Americans was probably much more
significant. Bush did not have to work to define the situation as a crisis. Most
Americans felt some or all of following emotions: sadness, anger, vulnerability, or fear
after 9/11. It was those emotions that Bush was able to speak to in his call to attack Al-
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Qaeda in Afghanistan. Because of the magnitude of the event to which he was
responding, President Bush’s personal character mattered little. Members of Congress
and Americans were ready to rally around the President and go to war in the fall of
2001. The decision to expand the war on terrorism into Iraq in 2003 was more
controversial, but Bush was again able to effectively identify and appeal to the emotions
of Americans to gain support for military intervention.
In addition, President George W. Bush had a certain amount of character
imputed to him from his family name. He was associated with this father at times. The
elder Bush, though only serving one term as President, had had what many consider a
“successful” Presidency, especially when viewed eight to ten years later. Even the
elder Bush’s critics would probably agree that Bush had successfully utilized the military
in the Gulf War. George W. Bush capitalized on the successes attributed to his father to
establish his own character.
President Barack Obama had come into office with a reputation for a strong
personal character, or, at least no major blemishes on his personal character. He was
in his second term as President in August 2013 when President Assad used poison gas
in Syria. However, like Clinton and George W. Bush before him, Obama had no
significant experience in foreign relations prior to taking office. He had no military
record, stellar or otherwise. In fact, Obama had campaigned and been elected in part
for his position of ending America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, President
Obama could not rely on character imputed from his personal experience in foreign
relations or military matters prior to being elected.
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In addition, Obama had a problem relying on the character imputed by the office
of the Presidency as a basis for his rhetoric when attempting to persuade Congress and
the American people to support a military response to Assad’s use of poison gas in
Syria. Most of President Obama’s first term in office had been characterized by
continuous battles with Congress over domestic issues, including health care and the
economy. Obama did not have a better record in international issues, with many
questions being asked about Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s knowledge and actions
in relation to Benghazi. To be fair, with Americans so war weary after more than a
decade of war by August of 2013, even if President Obama had enjoyed character
imputed by significant experience and a stellar military record, and even if President
Obama had retained the character of the office based on his time as President, neither
form of character was probably enough to overcome most Americans’ disinterest in
returning to war.

ii.

Logical arguments could be important, but appeal to emotional elements
was critical.

Aristotle’s model posited that a speaker was more persuasive when presenting
an argument in which facts could be proved. Logic was an important factor in the
model. All four post-Cold War presidents considered herein used logical arguments in
their rhetoric when calling Americans to war. However, upon careful consideration of
the logical arguments presented, the facts and logical arguments presented were often
combined with or dependent upon connecting with the emotions of the members of the
audience in order to be effective.
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For instance, George H.W. Bush in his address announcing the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait outlined American interests in demanding that Iraq withdraw and sending troops
to protect Saudi Arabia, but only after characterizing the invasion in terms that were
meant to appeal to the emotions of Americans. When Bush stated that the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait was a situation in which Americans were “called upon to define who
we are and what we believe,”2 he was essentially making a moral argument that
contained both elements of logic and emotion. At the risk of oversimplifying, it appeared
that Bush was asking Americans to remember that they were “good” people who did the
“right” thing, and in this situation, the “right” thing to do was to assist Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia against the “bad” Iraqis. The argument was logical and simple, but it also
appealed to the emotions of Americans. Even if Americans did not always do the “right”
thing, Bush recognized that Americans wanted to feel like they were doing the “right”
thing.
Bush further characterized Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in terms to which he believed
Americans could relate: subtle and sometimes not so subtle references to history. In
calling the attack and occupation of Kuwait a “brutal act of aggression” and later a
“blitzkrieg,” Bush evoked brutal acts of aggression from the past, most importantly
Hitler’s brutal act of aggression in attacking and occupying a number of countries in
Europe during World War II. Bush later used the word “appeasement” in noting that
appeasement does not work and he called Saddam Hussein an “aggressive dictator.”
These rhetorical references to history not only helped form a logical argument for
military intervention - - appeasement of an aggressive dictator did work as a strategy in
the 1930s, so it will not work now - - but they recalled emotions that many Americans
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shared about World War II, a “good” war in which America was strong and was
victorious in defeating a brutal dictator.
Bush utilized these same themes throughout his Gulf War rhetoric, but also
added an argument that American military involvement in the Gulf was part of a bigger
plan. The Gulf War was not going to be “another Vietnam” because Americans had
defined objectives, first, in protecting Saudi Arabia, and second, in pushing Iraqis out of
Kuwait. The Gulf War was also part of Bush’s “new world order.” Bush had a plan for a
world governed by the rule of law, and with America taking a leading role. This type of
argument had elements of logic - - only by standing up to aggressive dictators like
Saddam Hussein can we have the rule of law in the world - - but it also appealed to the
emotions of most Americans. President Bush gambled that most Americans not only
wanted a peaceful world governed by the rule of law, but also wanted America to regain
its status as a world leader. The Cold War was over. The Soviet Union was breaking
apart. It was time for the United States to re-assert its status as the number one nation
in the world.
President Clinton likewise blurred the line between logical arguments and
arguments meant to appeal to emotion. Clinton presented two major themes to his
advocacy of American involvement in the Kosovo bombings: one, the avoidance of the
situation in Serbia and Kosovo escalating into a broader regional conflict, and two, a
humanitarian necessity to intervene in order to prevent further loss of life. The themes
were connected and both used elements of logic and elements meant to appeal to
emotion.
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Like Bush before him, Clinton used references to history to aid his argument.
Many believed that an assassination in Sarajevo had been a catalyst in the events that
escalated and ultimately led to World War I. The logical argument was that the United
States had to act in order to avoid the Kosovo conflict occurring in Eastern Europe from
escalating into another world war, as had occurred with World War I. However, there
was also an emotional element. Though perhaps vague with the details, most
Americans understood and believed that World War I had been successful. America
had done the “right” thing then and had stood with the victors in 1918. Most Americans
wanted to do the right thing again.
Clinton’s perhaps more overt argument meant to appeal to emotion was his
humanitarian argument for American involvement in Kosovo. By participating in the
Kosovo bombings, Americans were protecting “innocent” people from being killed.
Again, Clinton turned to history in his rhetoric. When Clinton described “innocent
people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets,” he
was evoking the horrors of Nazi warfare in World War II.3 Clinton also called it a “moral
imperative” that America intervene in Kosovo.4 By participating in the Kosovo
bombings, Clinton argued, America was not only making a moral choice, but was
playing a similar role it had played successfully in World War II, the role of protector.
Americans could feel good about participating in the bombings.
Like his father and President Clinton before him, President Bush also mixed
the logical elements of his rhetoric with appeals to emotion. In the immediate aftermath
of 9/11, George W. Bush made a logical argument for sending American troops to
Afghanistan, but because emotions were running so high, the logical elements to the
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argument were almost superfluous. Americans were scared, sad and angry after 9/11.
Revenge seemed a reasonable objective under the circumstances, if only to prevent a
future attack. It was enough to remind Americans of the “courage” and “endurance” and
“decency” of other Americans in response to 9/11 to make an argument that the
“patriotic” and “right” thing to do was to give Afghanistan a brief period in which to
produce the terrorists responsible for the attack, and failing that, to send troops into
Afghanistan. Bush was careful to include the military, members of Congress and
“regular” Americans in his address to show how unified America was unified in its
objective.
The logical elements to Bush’s rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 were
“almost superfluous,” but not completely superfluous. In fact, President Bush was able
to use the strong emotions connected to the 9/11 attack to gain support for a broader
plan to combat terrorism. Bush importantly defined the terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda as
an “act of war,” which allowed him to formulate a war-plan to respond. In his September
20, 2001, address Bush laid out his plan, defining the enemy, laying out conditions to be
met, and threatening a response if those conditions were not met.
Like his father and Clinton before him, Bush utilized historical references. Note
that all three paid particular attention to World War II references. World War II
remained, and perhaps remains today, the “good” war, fought against an undisputed
enemy and fought successfully. The younger Bush described Al-Qaeda as “heirs” to
the “murderous ideologies” of the twentieth century and said Al-Qaeda members
followed the path of “fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.”5 This type of rhetoric
contained elements of logic - - America must stop Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda
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before they become as powerful as Hitler and Nazis - - but, again, also evoked strong
emotions shared by most Americans about World War II. Americans felt good about
World War II. They could feel good about a military response to Osama bin Laden and
Al-Qaeda. Bush called the war on terrorism a “fight for freedom.”6 All Americans could
feel good about joining a fight for freedom.
President Bush’s advocacy for the expansion of the war on terrorism in March of
2003 by sending troops into Iraq required more logical elements as the emotions of 9/11
had calmed a bit in the intervening eighteen months. Bush made three arguments: first
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction; second, that Iraq, if left unchecked, could
link with “terrorist allies” and attack the United States; and, third, that by intervening
militarily in Iraq, the United States could help bring peace and stability to the Middle
East.7 These were appeals to logic, but also contained elements of emotion.
For instance, when Americans considered the term “weapons of mass
destruction,” there was an element of fear. It made sense to find and destroy weapons
of mass destruction from a logical viewpoint, but also especially from an emotional
perspective. Americans did not want another 9/11. Likewise, though Iraq had not
directly attacked the United States yet, there was uncertainty about whether Iraq would
link with groups like Al-Qaeda to carry out attacks on the United States. Preventing
future attacks and protecting America was both a logical argument and an emotional
argument. American pride was also at stake. American pride had taken a serious blow
with the 9/11 attacks. The opportunity to bring peace and stability to the Middle East
would allow America to re-assert itself as the pre-eminent world power.
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President Barack Obama made similar appeals to both logic and emotion when
he advocated for a military response to Assad’s use of poison gas in August of 2013.
The primary difference, however, was that Obama was not successful. He was unable
to define the situation as enough of a crisis to merit a strong military response. Like the
preceding post-Cold War presidents, Obama mixed his logical arguments with appeals
to emotion. However, unlike his predecessors in the Oval Office in the post-Cold War
world, Obama either did not believe as strongly in the position for which he was
advocating or realized that, politically, it was just not going to work, or both. Ultimately,
Obama realized Americans were just too tired of war to care enough about Assad to
respond militarily.
Obama attempted to make an argument for a military response that was similar
to the argument made by President Clinton. First, there was a humanitarian argument.
Assad has used poisonous gas in the “worst chemical weapons attack in the 21st
century.”8 Because use of chemical weapons and particularly poisonous gas were (and
are) thought to such heinous acts, President Obama felt that he could appeal to the
emotions of members of Congress and the American people. Like previous post-Cold
War Presidents, Obama asked Americans to respond to this “assault on human dignity”
by making the moral choice to do the right thing. However, Americans were war weary
after more than a decade of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. A moral choice to send
troops or respond militarily in far off Syria would be a lot easier if Americans perceived a
direct threat.
President Obama tried, almost half-heartedly, to make the case that Assad’s use
of poisonous gas represented a direct threat to the United States, but ultimately failed.
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Obama spoke about the potential for escalation of violence. He spoke about Syria’s
actions endangering America’s “friends” on Syria’s borders. He spoke about the
potential for chemical weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists. In the end, it was not
enough. Americans had had enough. Members of Congress, correctly reading the
polls, warned Obama not to bring the issue to a vote in Congress. Obama backed
down, first broaching the issue of a potential diplomatic resolution while maintaining a
threat of military intervention, and then later more broadly embracing a diplomatic
course of action.
Interestingly, Obama used fewer references to World War II than other post-Cold
War Presidents. It could be that, initially, Obama thought a comparison of Assad’s use
of poisonous gas on his people to Milosevic’s assault on his own people would be
enough to stir the emotions of Americans and win support for the use of military force.
However, that comparison alone proved to be not enough. Following more than a
decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American people needed a shared
experience stronger and more meaningful than Kosovo to evoke the emotion needed to
support the use of military force.

iii.

The use of Presidential rhetoric as a call to war continues to evolve, but
the emphasis will be on the ability of the speaker to appeal to the
emotions of the audience.

The use of rhetoric by United States presidents as a call to war in the post-Cold
War world continues to evolve. This thesis began with President Barack Obama, in a
September 2014 speech, calling Islamic State terrorists a “network of death” that must
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by “destroyed.”9 While Obama made a logical argument, use of phrases such as
“network of death” demonstrate that appeal to emotion remained paramount. Several
months later, as this is being written in March 2015, the Islamic State terrorists continue
to pose a threat as the United States and other countries work to determine how best to
combat them. It is a fair assumption that President Obama is considering how best to
communicate his plans to Congress and the American people, and, if he determines
that additional United States military action is required, how best to inspire Congress
and Americans to support that action. Obama will make appeals to logic, but, more
importantly, appeals to emotion. Presidential rhetoric will be an important factor again
in the call to war for President Obama, and will continue to be an important factor for
future Presidents.
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Conclusion: notes

1. Aristotle, Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, Book 1, Part 2, accessed at
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.1.i.html, accessed April 18, 2015.
2. President George H.W. Bush, Address on Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait (August 8,
1990), http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-5529, accessed
April 17, 2015.
3. President William Clinton, Statement on Kosovo (March 24, 1999),
http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/speeches/speech-3932, accessed April
18, 2015.
4. Id.
5. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People, September 20, 2001, The Avalon Project,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/address_001.asp, accessed April 18, 2015.
6. Id.
7. President George W. Bush, Message to Saddam, March 17, 2003,
http://presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/03.17.03.html, accessed April 18, 2015.
8. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Syria, August 31, 2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-presidentsyria, accessed April 18, 2015.
9. President Barack Obama: Address to the United Nations, September 24, 2014.
http://www.politico.com, accessed April 17, 2015.
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